# SECRET

30 October 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: FBIS Historical Officer

SUBJECT   :   Revised draft of FBIS history titled
                   "The Foreign Documents Division,
                   1946-1967"

1. The DDI Historical Officer has read and
approved the revised draft of the FBIS history titled
"The Foreign Documents Division, 1946-1967" by
[   ] has done an excellent job of revising
his draft and the paper is now ready for further
processing.

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2. The reviewer has a single suggestion -- that
the present Appendix A "Commentary" be renamed
"Conclusion" and made the final chapter of the history.
Some minor changes, mostly editorial, have been made
directly on the manuscript and are noted for the
record in the attachment.

3. The Historical Staff will forward this
paper directly to the DDI Historical Board for re-
view prior to final typing of the manuscript in FBIS.

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DDI Historical Staff

Attachment

CLASSIFIED BY
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1). (2) or (3) or (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Impdet
(unless impossible insert date or event)

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THE FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION

1946 - 1967

VOLUME II

by

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WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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**WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED**

DOCUMENTS BRANCH

17 December 1946

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                    │   the Chief     │
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   │ and Security    │       │       │ Planning Office │
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
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS BRANCH

27 June 1947

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                    │  John J. Bagnall,    │
                    │    acting chief      │
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│ Survey   │ │ Division │ │ Division │ │  Division   │
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
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FOREIGN DOCUMENTS BRANCH

29 July 1948

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│ Source Survey│ │ ing & Reference │ │   Service   │ │ and Technical │
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
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FOREIGN DOCUMENTS BRANCH

24 August 1949

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                    │ John J. Bagnall,│
                    │     chief       │
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FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION

27 June 1951

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                    │ John J. Bagnall,│
                    │     chief       │
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Reports Branch	Documents Control Branch	Scientific and Technical Branch	USSR Branch
chief	chief	chief	chief

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Eastern Europe Branch	Far East Branch	Near East /Africa Branch	Western Europe Branch
chief	chief	chief	acting chief

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FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION

1 April 1965

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│     chief        │                        └──────────────────┘
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Support Branch - - - chief	USSR Branch - - - chief	Asia Branch chief	Europe/Africa /Latin America Branch chief

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        │    Branch        │
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FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION

9 June 1960

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FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION

1 April 1957

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
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION

1 October 1953

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                    │    chief         │
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
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION

7 May 1953

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                    │      chief          │
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│Branch  │ │and       │ │ Branch   │ │  Europe      │
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   │Branch │ │/Africa   │ │Europe   │
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
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
THE FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION
1946 - 1967

VOLUME II

by

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Approved:

Foreign Broadcast Information Service
Directorate of Intelligence
April 1974

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Appendixes

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VOLUME II

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Consumers

A. General

In its evolving role in the Agency as a "common-service"
organization, the Foreign Documents Division was from the
beginning placed in close relationship with every intelligence-
producing Office not only in the CIA itself but in the entire
US intelligence community as well. Moreover, as a collector
and producer of raw information from overt published world
source material, its product was also in demand from a large
segment of the non-intelligence community, governmental as
well as public and private academic, research, commercial,
and industrial institutions. As a result, the division was
subject to pressures created by a wide variety of demands
for service, in terms both of quantity and quality, which
at times taxed the capabilities of its personnel to the
utmost. The increasing volume of requirements levied on
FDD, with the resultant expansion of its program as the
division shifted from captured documents processing to current
source exploitation, coupled with its limited work force gave

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promise of a potentially chaotic situation by 1949. It made
imperative the establishment of some system of priorities to
enable the division to contend with the formidable task
facing it. Since such a system was a potential threat to
the parochial interests of every producing CIA Office, each
inclined to regard its product as sacrosanct and of first
priority in the general scheme of intelligence production,
there was a genuine possibility that the contending units
would attempt to use their influence to shape the production
function of the division to suit their own ends or, failing
this, to reserve the function, each Office for itself.
Fortunately, there was a general recognition that a "common
service" operation was needed to best serve the community
as a whole, and the establishment of various exploitation
committees in the Agency from 1949 on aided immeasurably in
establishing the necessary priorities. In cooperation with
these committees, considerable FDD activity was devoted to
establishing a smooth working arrangement with its consumers
designed to iron out difficulties and conflicts which arose
in the normal order of things. This involved a continuing
program of liaison. It goes without saying that much of the
distrust of FDD's capability to conduct its exploitation
program was based on misunderstanding and ignorance, mainly

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in respect to personnel qualifications in FDD. Thus, the
closer and more frequent the liaison, the more productive the
division's contact with a respective Office tended to be.

1. Consumer Attitudes

To succeed as a service organization, FDB had to base
its operations on a close and responsive relationship with
its consumers. This had to be a two-way arrangement, with
the branch actively maintaining liaison in order to determine
the purposes and goals of the consumer Offices and adjusting
its operational program thereto and with the Offices, on
the other hand, keeping FDB fully apprised of trends in their
operations so as to enable the branch to apply its limited
manpower resources in the most effective manner possible. Un-
fortunately, such a free-flowing interchange was frequently
more theory than fact. In the early period, the liaison
concept had difficulty getting off the ground and a good
deal of the time it worked only in fits and starts. Over
the long term, however, following a lengthy period of trial and
error, a *modus vivendi* was arrived at which provided, if not
a perfect relationship, at least a workable one.

The factors militating against more than passing success
were several. There was, first of all, the distance, already
cited, separating FDB from its consumers. The physical

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separation plus the inconvenience of the logistics involved, tended to create a feeling of estrangement and even distrust which was hard to dispel. Relations, with some exceptions, were usually correct but not overly cordial. The close rapport which would have resulted had it required only a few steps down a hall or to an adjacent building was difficult to achieve when every personal contact involved a trip across the city.

Another aspect of the problem was the security factor. In certain areas of the Agency, [ ]

[ ] some desk officers found it difficult to accept the fact that FDB officers were fully cleared for "Top Secret" material and for sensitive exploitation or translation. This situation changed gradually and eventually reached the point where, in 1956, FDD officers briefed [ ]

[ ]

However, even in less sensitive parts of CIA, such as ORE and OSI, the clearance of FDB personnel sometimes appeared to be suspect and the need-to-know security concept was carried to ludicrous extremes, so much so that the documents officer was often shut off from all knowledge of the real purpose of the requirement and therefore of what to look for. This

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frequently led to a wasteful and time-consuming requirement
from his consumer to "give us everything."

Another discouraging aspect of the attitude of "distrust"
on the part of some consumers, especially in the early years,
was the apparent contempt in which FDB source material was
held. There appeared to be a general impression that intel-
ligence from overt sources was less valuable and, in considera-
tion of the propaganda-infested materials from which much of
it was extracted, less reliable than information derived from
clandestine sources. This often gave rise to the "last resort"
type of requirement, sent to FDB when the consumer had ex-
hausted all other sources available to him. Such requests
were often levied on FDB in the last days before an intelligence
report was to be issued. The resultant short deadlines fre-
quently created "flaps" in normal FDB operations which were
in most instances quite unnecessary.

A final factor in strained consumer relations was the
inability of many analysts in the production areas of the
Agency to conceive of the average documents officer being
anything but a "translator," this despite the fact that the
educational level of FDB personnel compared favorably with
that of the production areas, that the number of advanced
degrees was high, and that many of the documents officers had

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received their college training in disciplines other than
language or linguistics, often in addition to the latter.
Moreover, in the course of time most documents officers be-
came experts in the substantive fields to which they were
assigned and developed a sensitivity to the content and tone
of the foreign press which could come about only after many
years' exposure to it. Despite all this, there was a constant
and irritating tendency on the part of consumers to refuse to
accept FDB employees as intelligence officers in the full
sense of the word. This attitude had a depressing effect on
morale and, to some extent, created a feeling of resentment to-
ward the consumer Offices. FDB waged a continuing struggle
to gain "acceptance." In time, this was achieved to a degree,
both from the security and substantive standpoint, but it was
exceedingly slow in coming.

2. Requirements

In the course of the transition from captured document
to current source exploitation, FDB's program was largely
developed and shaped by the requests for specific types of
information levied on the branch by consumer Offices. Evolving
gradually, the requirements program took several forms. It
consisted, first of all, of guide requirements, which were
more or less broad statements of need within a given category

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or discipline and usually remained in force until discontinued or altered by the consumer. The results of FDB research based on these were most often issued in periodic scheduled reports. A second category was specific, or ad hoc, requirements representing, as the term implied, assignments of search for or processing of a specific item of information, usually with a deadline, and reported in a single, one-time report. Finally, there were translation requests, entailing the literal translation of an article or passage, usually submitted, if not available in FDB, by the consumer for processing by the branch.

The guide requirements were usually compiled by components in the intelligence community at the branch or division level and issued to FDB on a periodic basis with updating as required. Copies were submitted to the FDB officers servicing the areas covered by the requirements. Using these guides, often with a frequency to the point of knowing the contents by heart, they would scan their sources and prepare for the requesters only items of intelligence value.

The specific and translation requests, on the other hand, were submitted to the FDB desk officer on an as-required basis through the FDB Reports Division on formal requirements forms which spelled out specifically what the consumer wanted.

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The desk officer acted on the request in accordance with the priority indicated. Both guide and specific requests were often supplemented by telephonic and, less frequently, face-to-face discussions. These contacts proved a valuable means of solving exploitation problems.

In the early period, consumer requirements were generated through the circulation of accession lists prepared by the branch on the basis of captured documents available in Washington depositories or of more current documents sent from overseas. For reasons discussed earlier, this method proved unsatisfactory. It was unwieldy and slow and was, moreover, inefficient in that as time went by an increasingly smaller number of these lists were actually put to use. With this in mind, John Bagnall opted for a drastic change in the interest of greater efficiency. In July 1947 he proposed his "Dynamic Approach to Document Exploitation," cited earlier,* in which he called for discontinuance of the accession lists and the substitution of a detailed list of requirements on the USSR and Far East, subsequently expanded to include other world areas, to be drawn up by ORE. His proposal also called for intra-area priorities for the

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* See p. 62.

development of specific basic information. 390/

The effect of this memorandum on the Agency's require-
ments policy vis-a-vis FDB has already been touched on in
an earlier chapter.* To review briefly, the AD/O ordered a
survey concerning the establishment of overall detailed
requirements, but by the end of 1947 the receipt of large
numbers of requests from ORE and the issuance of OCD's
"Estimates of Intelligence Target Potentials" gave the branch
sufficient information to warrant cancellation of the require-
ments survey.

As the workload in the branch increased, it became
obvious that some system of establishing priorities for
requests submitted to FDB would have to be instituted. The
problem was complicated not only by rivalry for FDB services
among CIA Offices but even within the Offices themselves.
Therefore, in January 1948, OO and OCD took steps to establish
orderly procedures. The consumer Offices were asked to
survey their requirements and to assign priorities for their
completion, a priority system for incoming requirements on a
graded basis was established for FDB guidance, and closer
coordination was effected between OCD, through which all

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* See Ch. Three.

service requests had to pass, and FDB in the acceptance of requirements. A suggested panel system to establish priorities was not acted upon, pending further study. 391/ Although periodically reconsidered, this matter was never officially resolved, and priority scheduling for the FDB workload was therefore, of necessity, assumed by the Chief of FDB.

Although the attempt to institute a priorities system failed, the effort to improve and refine requirements procedures continued. A 15 June 1948 conference between FDB and ORE paved the way for a better understanding of requirements and for closer cooperation on this matter at the operations level. A simplified procedure for forwarding requests (translation only) from ORE directly -- without recourse to OCD as in the past -- to FDB was set up on a trial basis. The product, as usual, was to be distributed by OCD. 392/ This trial proved the direct request to be much more efficient and faster than the old system, and in January 1949 the new method was also applied to OSI requirements. 393/ In September it was further expanded to include all Offices. 394/ The change eliminated an unnecessary extra step in the operation and created a closer and, therefore, more responsive relationship between FDB and its consumers. The procedure did not reach full consummation, however, until 1957 when arrangements were made

for all types of requirements from each of the IAC agencies
to come directly to FDD. This step simplified the procedure
by eliminating the usual Liaison Division channel of CIA. 395/
Such streamlining was a step long overdue in the progress
toward creating a viable service function.

Meanwhile, the increased trust of consumer Offices in
FDD capabilities was readily evident in the sharp rise in re-
quests for service levied on the division. During the period
October 1950 - October 1951, for example, the number of
requirements for exploitation of current documents received
by FDD from the IAC agencies, including CIA, was more than
double the number received in the previous 12-month period. 396/
In the same period, requests for translation service also
increased, by some 25 percent. 397/ These increases resulted
in part from the expanding activities of the various CIA
Offices and in part from the increased dependence upon FDD
services by the other IAC agencies.

To keep current with consumer needs, FDD began periodi-
cally to conduct surveys on requirements. In August 1950,
such a survey was undertaken among the various CIA Offices
to determine the actual extent of translation requirements of
a classified and unclassified nature. This study revealed a
requirement of more than 90,000 pages in the classified and

approximately 40,000 pages in the unclassified category, this

against an FDD annual processing potential of only 20,000

pages. 398/ Increased staffing seemed the obvious solution

to this problem. In October 1951, a similar survey of all

CIA Offices was made, and thereafter this became an annual

practice. 399/ The device proved beneficial in keeping the

division familiar with changing consumer needs and also in

helping it to project plans for operational adjustments.

To supplement the surveys, FDD periodically examined

its requirements compendium in cooperation with the consumer

Offices in order to weed out requests no longer valid and,

where necessary, to up-date the balance. This might be ac-

complished through direct liaison or through the convenient

medium of the IAC exploitation committees or subcommittees.

In March 1951, for example, a compilation of State Department

guide requirements was prepared by the division for review,

revision, and amendment by State officials. At the same

time, 27 guides prepared by the former ORE were cancelled

when that Office became ORR; these guides were replaced by

a new list. 400/

In late April 1954,   Chief of FDD's   25X1

Reports Branch (BR), proposed the elimination of guide or

continuing requirements as a requirements category. Citing

the existence of 170 active guides in the division as of
that date, he pointed out that although guides had once
served to define the aims and interests of FDD consumers, the
intimate knowledge of intelligence community needs developed
by FDD intelligence officers over the past seven years
obviated the further necessity for having them. In view of
this, he proposed treating the guides as "statements of
interest" which FDD could use but for which it would not be
accountable. He suggested that greater emphasis should be
placed on generating specific requests. 401/

Bagnall submitted the [   ] proposal for consideration
by the Subcommittee on Exploitation of Foreign-Language
Publications (SEFLP), an IAC exploitation review group formed
in 1953.* As a result of an examination of the heavy over-
lapping and duplication among the 170 guide requirements and
the pertinent clarification resulting from a discussion
of these by SEFLP members, on 31 May 1954 FDD abandoned guide-
type requirements and from then on merely accepted their
substance as a general indication for program guidance. There
was some doubt as to the benefit to overall FDD operations
that such guides exercised. Unlike specific requests, many

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* Cf. p. 352.

of the guides were so broad in scope as to become almost mean-
ingless. They were, however, of some service as a general
delineation of the consumer's interests. As such, they could
be as meaningful as the latter made them.

Specific requirements received by FDD also showed a con-
siderable decline in numbers after mid-1954, due largely to
the scheduled reporting program adopted earlier* and to the
greater degree of coordination stemming from the periodic
Exploitation Subcommittee discussions.

3. Liaison

From FDD's inception in 1946, there was a general under-
standing in CIA and, to a lesser extent, in the rest of the
IAC that the division was to serve as a focal point for
the processing of foreign-language documents. The term "pro-
cessing" was, however, not specifically defined in the early
period and there was therefore some question as to what was
involved and how broadly to interpret the meaning of this
function. With the transition to peacetime intelligence
operations it was obvious that a central organization such
as FDB could perform the exploitation of documents on a more
economical basis than by having individual and possibly

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* Cf. p. 402 ff.

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duplicative work done by the respective departments in government. Thus, FDB was established to serve as this focus. At the same time, however, it was made clear that the departments of the community were reluctant to surrender this function wholesale and wished to translate and process internally certain current documents of a departmental nature. Consequently, rather than attempt to absorb the departmental activities in this respect, FDB directed its efforts toward foreign publications exploitation and toward providing a central reference point designed to maintain a check on work done or in progress and thereby to minimize the possibility of duplication by other government departments. Further, a certain part of FDD's operations was devoted to the translation of material required by other CIA and IAC Offices. As a common-service organization, the branch wished to avoid being swamped with translation material to the detriment of what it came to regard as its primary function, namely, document exploitation. The problem, as it evolved, came down to a matter of determining the degree to which FDD would perform as a translation organization and what form the exploitation function was to take. The history of FDD's relations with its consumers was therefore to a large extent concerned with achieving a satisfactory definition of these two elements.

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Until 1953, when the FDD operation achieved a degree of stability, the process of definition was slow and often laborious. Decisions had to be made which led at times to acrimonious exchange with consumers. Even after FDD's common-service function was officially authorized by NSCID 16 in 1953 there were occasions of conflict, but by then the division was in a better position than before to deal with them.

Separated as it was from the main CIA area and with the exact nature of its mission somewhat in doubt, a system of close liaison with consumer Offices was essential to maintain efficient operations. As FDD developed, liaison problems increased and, until early in 1951, only an awkward and time-consuming arrangement of liaison conducted through OCD was available to deal with them.

From December 1946 to June 1947, the old consumer relationships of the former WDC were maintained under administrative instructions of that period. Beginning in July 1947, FDB personnel were cleared through branch channels for operational liaison with government and non-government agencies. The initial contacts were established and had to be cleared three times -- through Contact Branch, OCD, and ICAPS. Monthly estimates of liaison for operational purposes were submitted

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for ICAPS approval and an accounting of these contacts had
to be made each month to OCD. This policy was fortunately
discontinued in November 1948 and it was stipulated that
liaison outside CIA would thenceforth simply be recorded by the
branch liaison officer. 402/ A further step in resolving
the liaison problem was taken with the issuance of a regula-
tion in May 1951 authorizing the establishment and maintenance
of liaison with the State and Defense Departments as the indi-
vidual responsibility of FDD's branch chiefs. 403/

Simultaneous with the relaxation on FDD contacts with
agencies outside CIA, exchanges with consumers within the
Agency were also encouraged through elimination of old taboos.
In 1951, the person-to-person concept was vigorously pushed
and liaison visits and regular telephone contacts were
encouraged. To augment informal desk-to-desk contacts, at
FDD's invitation groups of people from various CIA Offices
were periodically brought to the division for briefings on
FDD operations. In turn, FDD personnel during 1952 and 1953
visited their working-level counterparts in increasing numbers
to be briefed on the operations and requirements of their host
Offices. After the first flush of enthusiasm over the new
policy wore off, the number of group visits tended to decline,
but the individual contact between desks continued as before

and aided considerably in maintaining the effectiveness of FDD's services.

The work of the IAC exploitation committees served considerably to stimulate contacts between FDD and its consumers. To comply with the general and sometimes imprecise recommendations developed by the committees, FDD required more detailed and specific explanations of requirements so as to organize its personnel and materials most effectively. This called for close liaison. Thus, the intermingling of division officers with their counterparts elsewhere in CIA and in the IAC became increasingly necessary in order to meet the demands of consumers. The liaison mechanism, as much as anything, served to define the division's mission and to delineate its goal to serve the community in the most effective manner possible.

B. Intra- and Inter-Organizational Relations

    1. The CIA Offices

The establishment by FDD of an effective liaison system and closer contact with the consumer Offices was important and necessary in improving understanding and cooperation in inter-unit operations. Unfortunately, these could not and did not sublimate the human element and therefore

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failed to solve all the problems that arose in FDD's relations with the consumer Offices. Two of the major recipients in the Agency of FDD services were the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) and the Office of Research and Reports (ORR) and it was with these that the division experienced the greatest difficulty in achieving acceptance during the early period. All of the problems in consumer relationships discussed earlier applied here, but, briefly stated, the difficulties were due mainly to a failure of these Offices to understand and, more particularly, to trust FDD capabilities. Let us consider first the FDD-OSI relationship.

A CIA Management Staff study of FDD operations in 1950 clearly defined the problem. The study revealed that, despite numerous conferences, no completely satisfactory working relationship had been established between FDD and OSI. This was particularly evident in a dispute related to a discussion as to the desirability of continuing publication of FDD's *Periodical Abstracts (Scientific)*. Part of the difficulty could be attributed to the failure of OSI to accord to FDD any kind of independence of action and to the Office's desire to control and direct the FDD scientific effort totally toward its own objectives with no consideration for other consumers' needs. Moreover, the large volume of Russian-language material

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available but untouched due to a manpower shortage in FDD

caused OSI to make an unfair negative evaluation of the

FDD effort. On the other hand, the study attributed some

blame to FDD's Scientific and Technical Branch (BST), which

it faulted for poor leadership and for failure to clarify

its production and service capabilities within the limits

of its manpower resources. 404/

In a report of its own issued in August 1950, OSI

characterized FDD exploitation of scientific and technical

(S&T) materials as inadequate. The FDD system, complained

the report, gleaned pertinent information from the material

in a broad-brush manner rather than limiting its search to

information bearing on a specifically requested subject of

interest. 405/ In essence, the Office censured FDD's

failure to give exclusive support to OSI. The criticism was

accurate, if unjustified, since, to service the community as

a whole, FDD had developed its *Periodical Abstracts (Scientific)*

report on the basis of requirements from all scientific

branches of CIA and the IAC agencies.

OSI made clear that it found the *Periodical Abstracts*

(Scientific) report less desirable than translated tables of

contents -- a product which FDD had dropped when it turned over

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to the Library of Congress preparation of the *Bibliography of Current Soviet Periodicals*, a compendium which it had issued at the State Department's request since 1948. To support its case, the Office conducted a survey of user organizations and, on the basis of its results, recommended that the *Periodical Abstracts (Scientific)* be dropped and that FDD revert to the preparation of tables of contents from S&T periodicals and conduct abstracting only in compliance with specific requests. 406/ In making the recommendation, the Ad Hoc OSI Committee appeared to be unaware of the earlier *Bibliography* and the reasons for its transfer to the Library of Congress. In line with the proposal, OSI had earlier also complained of a lack of factual material from the FDD output. In disputing this contention, John Bagnall pointed to the figure of over 36,000 pages of scientific intelligence information produced by the division since August 1947. 407/

In December 1950, H. Marshall Chadwell, Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence (AD/SI), reported to George Carey that the Scientific Intelligence Committee (SIC), representing all IAC members, had unanimously recommended discontinuance of the *Periodical Abstracts (Scientific)* in favor of translated tables of contents of S&T periodicals. 408/ Carey bowed to the committee's will and agreed to follow its recommendations. 409/

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The report was discontinued on 18 January 1951. However,
this step proved premature and the OSI contention of unanimity
among the IAC members appears to have been based on a faulty
head count. Less than a month later, G-2, Army, expressed
vigorous opposition to the move 410/ and, shortly after, the
report was reinstated. 411/ A survey of IAC members conducted
by OCD during 1951 revealed an apparently unanimous approval
for continuance of the report. 412/ Regarding the OSI request
for translation of tables of contents, Carey disclosed in
February that numerous governmental and commerical organiza-
tions provided this service. Three readily available govern-
ment publications provided tables of contents for 80 of the
87 S&T titles of interest to OSI. 413/

The OSI campaign to eliminate the *Periodical Abstracts
(Scientific)* report to a large extent reflected the Office's
distrust of FDD capabilities. It believed that much of the
scientific information available in foreign sources was being
neglected, partly due to FDD's manpower limitations but, more
seriously, also to its failure to come to grips with the
problem. OSI felt that the FDD abstracter was not a scientist
and thus frequently failed to see the significance of a point
of scientific interest. Much intelligence, the Office felt,
was lost in this way. It therefore desired to limit FDD's

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role, at least in connection with S&T sources. It believed
that the ideal solution was to have S&T source exploitation
done wholly outside the intelligence community, and the Office
was preparing a study to determine the feasibility of this
arrangement. 414/

The idea that "translators" could not be "scientists"
died hard. The OSI prejudices were resurrected once again in
1953 during an OSI panel discussion conducted as part of an
Agency orientation course when [   ] of OSI dis-
closed his Office's intention to do away with complete reliance
on translation services such as FDD. It hoped to do so by
providing language training for selected OSI analysts. 415/
Attitudes and statements such as these had a depressing
effect on the morale of FDD S&T personnel. 416/ As frequently
happens, however, intent proved easier than performance. Al-
though a language-training program for analysts of OSI and
other producer Offices was set up, in the long run it had
minimal effect on the FDD workload.

FDD's support role also came under criticism from another
sector in the 1950s. Like OSI in the scientific field, ORR
was concerned that much of the fund of economic information
from foreign-language documents would be lost by FDD's in-
ability to cover source material adequately. In April 1952,

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Robert Amory, Jr., Assistant Director for Research and Reports
(AD/RR), found fault with the FDD exploitation mechanism and
expressed his opinion that ORR analysts alone were competent
to perform the screening function in the economic field. He
cited two reasons: first, because only ORR analysts were
familiar with the ORR research program and the FDD require-
ments system was an inadequate device to convey this knowledge
to the FDD analysts; second, FDD officers were translators
who should not be expected to develop secondary, that is, sub-
stantive, qualifications. Amory, therefore, recommended that
FDD abandon exploitation and concentrate exclusively on trans-
lation and allied services. 417/

FDD raised no objection to the Amory memorandum but
countered with a proposal to service ORR and OSI translation
requirements on demand and to give increased attention to the
exploitation requirements of the other CIA Offices and the IAC
agencies. 418/ Fortunately, the recommendation on translation-
only was later modified, and in the long run FDD continued to
function for the entire community with little or no change
in its exploitation method.

The 1952 dispute did not lead to a final resolution of
the problem, and the subject of exploitation-versus-translation
surfaced periodically. It was a subject of discussion at

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Exploitation Subcommittee sessions in August and December

1955, 419/ and again in July 1956. 420/ In each instance the

reluctance to trust FDD substantive competence and the con-

cern for missed information showed through. These sentiments

were generally expressed by the CIA Offices; the other IAC

agencies were more inclined to accept FDD exploitation.

During the early 1950s, another source of contention

with ORR was the time-lag factor which, from ORR's viewpoint,

prevented the use of most of FDD's output for current ORR

reporting. As an ORR-initiated effort in April 1952 to

help resolve the problem, Robert Amory suggested that only

a speedy rough verbatim translation was required to meet the

needs of his analysts and that informal ORR-FDD liaison could

be employed to iron out debatable points in text. Thereby

he hoped for a two-fold result: a reduction in FDD's work-

load and more rapid translation service for ORR. 421/ The

dangers of mistranslation and inaccuracies inherent in this

procedure, plus the expenditure in follow-up time to clarify

turgid passages, were readily obvious to FDD and OO and the

matter was quietly dropped.

In June 1952, ORR went a step further. An Office Regula-

tion was issued on 9 June designating [   ] of the   25X1

Office of the AD/RR as coordinator for all translation and

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exploitation requests to be issued by ORR analysts. In this

role, according to the regulation, [   ] would scan the   25X1

document and assist the analyst to determine its value, if

any. 422/ FDD's cooperation in this procedure was solicited

and, despite misgivings, was granted by OO. FDD and OO felt

that the Office of the AD/RR was not fully aware of the

pitfalls of the arrangement and they questioned it (internally)

on several counts: the neglect of desk-to-desk liaison;

[   ] ability to read the document if in a language un-   25X1

known to him; his competence to properly judge whether or not

to translate the document without prior reference to FDD's

cross-index (DEX) facility*; and the working of the operation

in the event of [   ] absence. [   ] DAD/O,   25X11

believed the arrangement to be a device to establish closer

control over ORR division and branch chiefs and to prevent

their "contamination" by FDD. 423/ Nonetheless, FDD agreed

to honor the ORR request and fulfilled only work cleared by

[   ] The system was followed for awhile but was then   25X1

permitted quietly to lapse. As had been anticipated, it

proved to be unworkable.

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* The DEX system, a facility devised by FDD to avoid trans-
lation duplication, will be more fully treated in the next
chapter.

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It was approximately during this period that [   ]   25X1

managed to ruffle FDD feathers through another ORR-initiated

project. This involved a Western Europe source survey in

the spring of 1952 participated in by [   ] in company   25X1

with the DAD/CD, [   ] In his report the former made   25X1

reference to "having kept in mind" ORR and OSI interests in

the course of the survey but made no mention of other IAC

agency needs. 424/ Their needs appeared to have been ignored,

an omission which underlined the fact that such surveys

should have been conducted by or at least coordinated with

FDD. On 11 June, John Bagnall issued a highly critical re-

view of the OCD-ORR survey reports, expressing disagreement

with some parts and citing several instances of misinformation.

Bagnall found that 90 percent of the documents purchased abroad

by [   ] were already on file in Washington. 425/ In an   25X1

effort to remedy the situation [   ] conferred with FDD   25X1

officers in August 1952 with the aim of clarifying misunder-

standings regarding ORR requirements and FDD capabilities. It

was planned that future difficulties would be resolved through

conferences of interested personnel. 426/

In its CIA consumer relations, FDD was involved in

the 1950s in a contentious exercise in policy development

which rivaled the intensity of the exploitation-vs-translation

dispute and to some extent was related to it. This was the question of FDD's "right" to perform "research" as part of its collection function. The issue should never have been raised since the term "research," as defined by FDD, involved only preliminary screening and selection and the collation of related substantive items for publication in one report. The FDD process was never intended to reach the evaluation stage. In fact, the term "research" was so jealously guarded by the evaluating Offices, that collecting organizations scrupulously avoided any semblance of research in composing reports. In late 1949, a feature was added to FDD publications which further added to consumer concern over possible FDD competition in the research field. This was the inclusion in text of short, bracketed commentary, usually to clarify a point or to tie together items of information from widely separated sources known to the FDD linguist but not readily available to the consumer. FDD's purpose in exploiting sources, collating the results, and adding commentary was not to usurp ORR or OSI analytical functions but, as it patiently and periodically explained, simply to reduce the huge amount of raw data to a manageable volume and to present it in a logically-arranged manner for the benefit of the consumer.

The preparation of "research" or, as FDD then erroneously termed them, "analytical-type" reports was taken under consideration as early as the fall of 1949. 427/ The first steps in this reporting method were favorably received. The division proposed in October 1949 to provide factual commentary in its reports and ORE concurred in this. The first example of a collated report with commentary -- a study of overseas Chinese reaction to the new Chinese Communist government -- was issued the following month and received favorable comment and a request for more of the same. Other reports of this nature, issued soon after, received the approbation of IAC agencies. 428/

Thus, with the understanding that such research would not extend into the field of evaluation, FDD increasingly engaged in documentary research to the satisfaction of consumer Offices. Collated and summarized reports were produced, by 1953 on a regular schedule, covering the subjects and source materials requested by principal users. Basic exploitation programs were established for China, Southeast Asia, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe, with a separate program to cover S&T information on the USSR and Satellite countries.

This form of division activity received early authorization. The Management Staff study issued at the end of 1950 recognized the research activity as an FDD function, though it

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recommended limiting it to no more than 20 percent of total activity. 429/ The Jackson survey of August-November 1951, while recognizing the apparent conflict with evaluating Offices over collated FDD reports, recommended that Chief, FDD, be advised that research was regularly within his jurisdiction where necessary to meet a requirement. 430/ Bagnall was so informed and continued operations as before.

The "research-type" report became a mainstay of FDD production, but as long as it existed, that is, throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, it came under periodic criticism by report users. To cite only one example, OSI expressed concern in March 1953 over FDD evaluations, despite the fact that the report content was identified as "unevaluated information" and the comments placed in brackets. Chadwell, AD/SI, declared that the fact that some of the comments were inaccurate and therefore misleading would be likely to impair CIA's reputation. He therefore recommended omission of the comments. 431/ In reply, George Carey expressed regrets for OSI's concern but cited commendation of the comments from at least one OSI division. Since the practice was based on consumer requests, he expressed reluctance to discontinue it arbitrarily, but left the matter open for future discussion by the IAC agencies. 432/

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Other such instances might be mentioned, but they would

merely repeat the theme of some opposition, mainly from the

upper echelons of ORR and OSI, and considerable support from

the balance of the IAC. Convinced that the methodology was

good, FDD continued to use it.

Despite lapses in inter-Office communications and coopera-

tion, coordination on document processing between FDD and the

consumer Offices gradually improved. Closer liaison, initiated

by FDD personnel, was conducted not only with ORR and OSI but

was extended into CIA's   as well and also assisted   25X1

in coordinating the requirements of other IAC units. With ORR

in particular, working-level conferences and seminars improved

mutual understanding of FDD's potential and the needs of

ORR's research analysts. The seminar method was used periodically

to review requirements and available source material. The

trend in 1952 was toward an increase in exploitation require-

ments, even from   One effect of this trend was   25X1

to decrease the translation load in favor of more exploitation.

Despite this, special translation work for the   25X1

increased materially, especially of   25X1

                material. During the period 1 October 1951 -   25X1

1 October 1952, for example, translation service requested by

                alone amounted to more than double the ORR   25X1

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requirement, the next highest. 433/ In 1952, requirements

against FDD were received for the first time from ONE and OCI.

The previous poor working relationships between OCD and FDD

were mollified through concerted cooperation, and mutually

acceptable procedures, representing compromise by both parties,

were developed. The relationship with consumer Offices had

by 1953 improved to such a degree that FDD's operational

methods were generally accepted without question.

2. The OO Divisions

In discussing FDD's inter-organizational relation-

ships in CIA, cognizance must also be taken of the division's

contacts with its sister organizations under OO, the Foreign

Broadcast Information Division and Contact Division.* We

have already considered the role of CD in FDD operations in

an earlier chapter on source procurement, and since this

function was the main reason for operational exchanges between

the two divisions, further discussions of Contact Division,

save for incidental references, will be dispensed with.

Both FDD and FBID, the remaining OO component, used

foreign-language press and propaganda sources, dealt with

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* The Sovmat Staff was subsequently also placed under OO, but
its relationship with FDD was so slight that for the purpose
of this history it may be ignored.

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openly published material of a similar character, and required

personnel with specialized linguistic qualifications.* From

the beginning, the FDD-FBID working relationship was a rela-

tively limited but sustained phenomenon. As with other parts

of the Agency, FDD's physical separation had an adverse affect,

and this situation was not improved until the division's move

in January 1961 to the Matomic Building, where the other OO

divisions were located. With the exception of the propaganda

analysis operations, in which FDD became involved with FBID

in the 1950s,** few attempts at operational integration were

made. Some interchange of translated product occurred,

particularly in the later years, with the major bulk consisting

of unpublished FBID intercepts sent to FDD for incorporation

in the latter's reports, but this activity was always quite

restricted. The chief reason for the limited extent of contact

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* See Ch. Eleven.

** In a strict sense, with exception of its Radio Propaganda
Branch (RPB), FBID cannot be classified as a consumer of FDD.
Both components engaged in overt collection activities to
serve common consumers and to a great extent supplemented
one another. It is by reason of this similarity of function
that the FDD-FBID relationship is included in this chapter.

was the nature of the source material employed by the two
divisions — the very current radio intercept of FBID as con-
trasted with the slower press receipts of FDD. In time this led
to an understanding between the two that the bulk of FDD activity
would be devoted to basic, mainly economic and scientific,
reporting, while FBID would handle current, mainly political,
materials.

Cooperative activity between FDD and FBID generally took
the form of rendering mutual assistance to alleviate emergency
language situations or of one supplying facilities or source
materials not available to the other. Both organizations
profited from such cooperation. In respect to FDD contribu-
tions, for example, reference materials prepared or procured
by FDD were supplied to FBID field bureaus; FDD linguists were
on occasion assigned for FBID use at headquarters or abroad;
and FDD sometimes performed emergency spot translations for
FBID in rare or difficult languages. In addition, regular
FDD exploitation and translation service was at FBID's disposal
and was frequently used, primarily by the staff of FBID's
Radio Propaganda Branch.

FDD also benefitted. On the occasion of a 1951 FDD
source survey trip to the Far East, for instance, FBID made its
wire service channels available to insure rapid coordination

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between FDD headquarters and [   ] document facility.

FBID was particularly valuable to FDD as a procurement agent.
In this connection, it served best as a procurer of regular but
hard-to-obtain sources, to fill in during an emergency when the
regular supplier had failed the division, or for rapid pro-
curement of spot copies through its overseas bureaus. In
September 1961, John Bagnall cited procurement as a prime FDD
problem, depending as it did on the OCR Library and, in turn,
the State Department. Procurement of Eastern European Satellite
publications, he said, was an exception, however, because of
their availability through the FBID Vienna Bureau. 434/

Cooperation between the two components was not limited
solely to source procurement but extended also to actual press
and periodical exploitation. This was made possible by the
existence of FBID's overseas collection facilities which provided
FDD, with FBID assistance, the means to establish a forward
echelon-type of press exploitation operation. A project,
approved 26 January 1951, set up a press scrutiny unit at
FBID's Saigon Bureau to cover Indochinese publications. The
purpose was to carry out current exploitation of selected
publications. A meeting between FDD and FBID representatives
was held 30 January 1951 to discuss how best to integrate and
coordinate the joint effort. 435/ A procedure involving press

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scrutiny at the Saigon Bureau and the coordination of this scrutiny with FDD's Washington-based operation was satisfactorily worked out and the project got underway. Beginning in July 1951, FDD intelligence officer-linguists were regularly assigned to Saigon to assist in the operation. The first to be named to this temporary duty post was [_____] 436/   25X1
A system of regular liaison was maintained by the two divisions to coordinate exploitation and prevent duplication. The value of having a forward press-exploitation unit such as this was emphasized in 1964 by a State Department memorandum which praised the service and strongly urged the expansion of the Saigon operation. 437/

Early in 1953, the possibility was discussed of establishing a similar press scrutiny unit in Europe to cover German sources. The project was coordinated between FDD and FBID, and in the fall of 1953 John Bagnall agreed to the assignment of [_____] an FDD officer, to Frankfurt for the   25X1
project. 438/ [_____] appointment, which involved supervis-   25X1
ing the Press Screening Section of the FBID German Bureau, was approved and in November 1953 he began his duties. The operation proved successful, and in May 1954 [_____] recommended   25X1
expansion of the project to exploit press items for FDD. In this, Bagnall concurred. 439/ As a result, FDD's German press

exploitation was consolidated with FBID press scrutiny in June 1954. FBID provided continuing support based on specific FDD requirements and operational instruction. 440/ The effect of the move was to relieve the pressure on the FDD staff in Washington handling German materials. Following completion of [   ] tour of duty at the German Bureau,   25X1
[   ] were successively assigned   25X1
to the post. 441/

    In November 1954, [   ] had proposed to [   ]   25X1
that an operation similar to the Frankfurt unit be established   25X1
in Vienna, 442/ but no further action was taken on this until 1957 when the proposal was revived by FDD. 443/ A joint FDD-FBID study, conducted in January 1957, dwelt on the duplication in press and periodical exploitation on Soviet Bloc publications which had resulted from the fact that FBID's RPB, under authority of an AD/O directive dated 12 December 1955, had since 1956 conducted scrutiny of selected USSR and East European publications. Concurrently, FDD had continued its scheduled reporting on much of the same literature. On the basis of the January study, the combined FDD-FBID group recommended joint exploitation of the sources, with current materials going to FBID and basic items to FDD for dissemination. 444/ After considerable debate between the two components concerning

the problems of costs and staffing, the project was finally
activated. Following subsequent staff studies and discussions
between the two organizations, the division-of-labor arrangement
to avoid duplication of services was put into effect in
February 1958. Journal processing was assigned to FDD and
press exploitation to the Vienna unit. 445/

The FDD-FBID relationship was not without its problems.
Some were easily resolved as they occurred, while others re-
mained a persistent irritant for long periods of time. Among
the latter was the matter of production authority and priorities.
As collection organizations dealing with overt media, the
content of which was frequently duplicative, FDD and FBID had
of necessity to conduct close liaison to prevent encroachment
on each other's activity in order to avoid wasted time and
effort. The situation was further complicated by the time
factor in the receipt of sources, usually a matter of hours
for FBID radio intercept and of days or, for the provincial
press, even weeks for FDD source publications. The problem of
time lag was in general solved by an agreement which provided
for FBID to publish press intercept, particularly from the
central or major newspapers, and for FDD to check its later
receipts against the FBID *Daily Report* to prevent duplication.
As a rule of thumb, this system worked satisfactorily, but it

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was not perfect. Conflict most often arose in connection with special service functions. For example, an Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) request in 1952 for FDD to institute a new political report covering information on leading Soviet personalities threatened to duplicate FBID's *Political Abstracts* report. 446/ Furthermore, the time lag in FDD's coverage of important central press and journal sources and FDD's authority for exploitation of these items were constant sources of irritation to FBID's RPB and resulted in several sharp exchanges. The establishment of the press scrutiny sections referred to above did much to alleviate this problem.

The prevention of duplication continued to be assiduously pursued, but a wholly satisfactory solution proved elusive. In 1954, [   ] Chief, FBID, requested a test on the duplication problem. A random issue of the *FDD Weekly Economic Information Report on China* was compared with the *FBID Far East Economic Abstracts* covering the same period. The comparison showed 44 items, or about 25 percent, to be duplications, 447/ which, surprisingly, [   ] characterized as not necessarily bad duplication. 448/

In June 1956, [   ] Chief of FDD's Eastern Europe Branch, was appointed by Bagnall to prepare a staff study to determine methods for closer coordination and cooperation

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between FDD and FBID. 449/ As a result of this undertaking and subsequent conferences between the divisions, new procedures were effected on 12 June 1957 to eliminate duplication in translating and publishing translations from the USSR and East European press. Under a reciprocal prior-notification arrangement (by telephone), each division undertook to notify the other within specified periods from the date of source publication before processing unbroadcast press materials. A full file of press and journal material processed by the Austrian Bureau was from then on supplied to FDD for information. 450/

Work on the problem went on. To some extent FBID's proclivity to impinge on the FDD press scrutiny function resulted from consumer pressure to benefit from the faster FBID service. This was the case in September 1959 when Carey commented on the large amount of USSR military press material in the 16 September FBID USSR book. He was told that this resulted from a Pentagon request for FBID coverage. The request had been coordinated with FDD, which, because of limited personnel to do the work, had not objected. Carey approved continuation of the procedure but only with close coordination with FDD. 451/ On 13 October a meeting was held by FDD-FBID representatives to eliminate any remaining overlap in press scrutiny operations. To avoid unnecessary duplication, it

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was decided that FBID would supply FDD with a daily list of
Soviet and East European press scrutiny items processed by the
Austrian and German Bureaus and would advise FDD whenever FBID
headquarters intended to request translations of press items
from its field bureaus. 452/ This arrangement, with modifica-
tions, was used from then on and, though somewhat cumbersome
in application, it was successful in keeping duplication to
a minimum.

3. The IAC Agencies

The subject of FDD's contacts with its consumers in
the intelligence community outside the CIA has already been
treated to some extent in earlier chapters of this history.
As noted, post-World War II financial stringency had compelled
the armed services to turn over the bulk of the postwar docu-
ment processing to the CIA with the result that the services
were largely dependent upon and thus in close contact with
FDB as beneficiaries of the service provided by the branch.
They were at the same time procurers and suppliers of the
captured documents which FDB at that time handled. Later on
they continued to service FDB's procurement effort when the
branch shifted to current sources, although by then the
major part of the effort had become a function of the State
Department.

Many of the problems encountered in the postwar period
by FDD in its relations with the various CIA Offices as it
sought to establish its primacy as the community's common-
service organ in document exploitation were also in evidence
in connection with the non-CIA agencies. While the community
as a whole accepted the general concept of FDD's common-
service role, the FDD function was only unofficially recognized
in the absence of an NSCID giving it official sanction. For
that reason the division was from time to time compelled to
deal with encroachments which threatened the entire concept.
With no binding restrictions on their document-processing
activity, some agencies engaged in projects designed to serve
exclusively their own narrow interests. This posed the threat
of wasteful and duplicative effort. FDD attempted to coordinate
such activity by liaison, primarily through the medium of the
various ad hoc document exploitation committees, but lack of
an NSCID made the effort difficult. Within the IAC, the
division encountered no particular problem with the Army or
the Navy. From the start of current exploitation these two
services appeared content to leave the bulk of document process-
ing in FDD hands. The fact that the original Documents Branch
was an amalgamation of the old wartime Army and Navy document
units contributed to a smooth transition. The services

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retained translation units of their own, however — an arrange-
ment which FDD, in light of its manpower shortage, approved.
The State Department intelligence unit proved less amenable to
FDD direction and, within the limits of State interest, operated
more or less independently. The greatest difficulty in the
coordination process arose in connection with the newly
established Air Force, which, while recognizing FDD's central
role, proceeded to set up its own document exploitation organi-
zation and procedures, primarily for air targeting. It insisted
that its purpose was a limited one, but this did not prevent
the duplicative processing of sources also handled by FDD.

To some extent the difficulties arising out of the FDD-
Air Force relationship were the result of a lost opportunity
on the part of CIA. In September 1947, Maj. Gen. George C.
McDonald, the Air Force's Director of Intelligence, suggested
that CIA take over such technical intelligence functions of
the Air Documents Division (ADD), T-2, Wright Field (Air
Materiel Command Intelligence) as might better be performed
centrally. After an inspection of T-2 by representatives of
ICAPS and OO, it was decided on 23 October that none of the
functions of T-2 were of "such common concern to IAC members"
that they should be assumed by CIA. 453/ ADD in late 1947
had only some 12 to 14 linguists who were used mainly for spot

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translation, but it was anticipated at that time that the operation would be greatly expanded in the next 6 to 12 months to handle a USSR project. FDB was advised to maintain contact with ADD to avoid duplication. 454/ The ICAPS-OO decision in effect gave the Air Force a green light to proceed on its own in document exploitation, and this it proceeded to do.

On 18 August 1948, George Carey noted that the Air Force had established a separate translation project designated "Treasure Island" consisting of 14 Air Force officers and civilians who supervised the work of approximately 85 translators and clerks employed by the Library of Congress for abstracting intelligence, in the Slavic languages, of interest to the Air Force. He pointed out, however, that in the absence of an NSCID, the field was open to any IAC member who wished to enter it. 455/

The Air Force decision to move into the document exploitation field, no matter how limited the project's objective appeared at first glance to be, was an unsettling development for FDB. The Air Force itself was aware of the move's potential for competitive activity. In a 20 September 1948 memorandum, Maj. Gen. Cabell, McDonald's successor, assured the DCI of his organization's exhaustive effort to avoid duplication and competition with the FDB operation. Cabell gave assurance

that the Air Force intent was to set up "not a super extracting agency but a modest effort in the air intelligence field." 456/

Carey requested John Bagnall to prepare an exhaustive critique on the "Treasure Island" project outline which the Air Force had submitted to CIA in August. This Bagnall did and, on the basis of his comments, Carey presented OO's and FDB's views on the proposal to the DCI in October. The thrust of the critique was negative, making the points that the function assumed by the new unit would duplicate FDB operations and that with proper requirements the branch could do the work for the Air Force. It also questioned the stated Air Force aim of keeping the project a "modest effort." 457/ The OO-FDB views were conveyed to the Air Force's attention by a DCI memorandum on 12 October, 458/ the effect of which was to cause a temporary Air Force retreat. After follow-up discussions between Air Force and CIA representatives, the Air Force stated its intention to rewrite the project, delimiting it in line with CIA's comments. It agreed, further, to levy requirements on FDB for information from current Slavic publications. 459/

With this apparent understanding with CIA on procedures, the Air Information Division (AID) was established at the Library of Congress under Air Force control early in 1949.

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It had a T/O of 110 (70 linguists) and its main purpose was to prepare, in abstract form, air intelligence information. To avoid duplication, FDD and AID reached an agreement at this time which provided for AID coverage of Soviet newspapers, journals, and books published prior to 1 January 1948 and for FDD coverage of those subsequent to that date. 460/ However, some time after February 1951, AID decided that due to the decreasing value of the older issues it could no longer hold to the agreement 461/ and it began exploiting current issues. Gradually, the Air Force operation expanded, so that by mid-1951 the "modest effort" foreseen by Gen. Cabell entailed exploitation of 114 newspapers and 81 journal titles, plus various monographs and miscellaneous materials. 462/ It also expanded to include East European and, by the beginning of 1953, Chinese publications. 463/ Of the newspaper titles covered, 17 Soviet and six East European ones were processed by both organizations. This duplication resulted from a failure in communication; AID felt that FDD was not covering material necessary to construct target mosaics while FDD regarded Air Force requirements as insufficiently specific. 464/ The problem appeared to defy solution despite a continuing effort to solve it through liaison.

In May 1952, FDD reached agreement with the Air Force's Air Research Division (ARD), renamed the Air Technical

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Intelligence Center (ATIC) soon after, arranging for con-
tinuous liaison between the two organizations and for a mutual
exchange of source requirements and completed reports. 465/
Establishment of this contact proved an apparent success if
one is to judge by the number of visits between Washington
and Dayton on FDD-ATIC business from then on. One important
step was the progress made toward a division of labor in the
matter of journal exploitation, the major source of duplica-
tion. In June 1954, responsibilities for abstracting S&T
publications were assigned as follows: FDD -- 19 titles,
AID -- 11, and ATIC -- 24. 466/ Despite this close liaison,
in 1955 FDD still complained of on-going duplication. 467/

As a member of the IAC, the State Department was an
eligible recipient of FDD services. Occasional requirements
were received by FDD and the pertinent division reports were
forwarded on a regular basis to the various State Department
offices. The first instance of FDB service in response to a
State request occurred in August 1948 when agreement was
reached on the exploitation of [   ] 468/   25X1
Guide requirements from State were regularly updated through
conferences, studies, and reviews. Liaison with State was
made more efficient by the May 1951 regulation authorizing

direct contact between FDD branch chiefs and their State

Department counterparts. 469/ Despite these steps, the State

Department tended to play a freer hand in document processing

and displayed less dependence on FDD than did other IAC

members. One may attribute this at least partially to the fact

that as the major supplier of FDD sources the Department was

in a position to make initial selections, if so inclined, even

before FDD came into the picture. However, in the wake of a

series of budget cuts imposed on State by Congress in the early

1950s, the Department tended to place more reliance on FDD.

Perhaps more to the point in this connection was the

fact that the State Department had been in the press exploi-

tation business, if on a less organized basis, long before FDD

was created and it was therefore disinclined to surrender this

function. The foreign press had been processed in one way or

another over the years at most of its diplomatic posts. This

monitoring ranged from a casual scanning of the local press

to the rather systematic coverage and reporting of the Joint

Press Reading Service (JPRS) in Moscow. The scope of the

coverage was almost entirely political and satisfied only

State requirements. The system was rather haphazard and

uncoordinated, required a large number of people, and resulted

in a considerable overlap of effort.

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Not all of State's press reading services were known to FDD since many posts did not report their findings. However, by 1953 some 88 diplomatic posts throughout the world prepared and disseminated some form of press review or digest. FDD found most of them to be of no value to IAC consumers other than State, but three State Department posts -- Moscow, Belgrade, and Hong Kong -- provided regular services of considerable value to some FDD consumers. The Moscow JPRS covered the Soviet central press for political information, and FDD was therefore able to concentrate on economic reporting from this press and general reporting from the provincial press. Press monitoring in Belgrade was of a more general character but here, too, FDD was able to review the reports and avoid duplication. In Hong Kong the situation was clouded. The Hong Kong Press Monitoring Service (HKPMS), in operation since 1950, covered economic as well as political materials and this created inevitable duplication with FDD. The division tried to reduce this through coordination but without appreciable results. A State proposal that HKPMS exploit all newspapers and FDD assume responsibility for journal and monographic exploitation was rejected by the division.

In general, the entire State Department press monitoring program covered only the field of major political developments

for which FDD, in 1953, had no requirements. There was there-
fore negligible overlap in actual coverage, but there was
significant duplication in the number of people covering the
same source material. The Department did not invite outside
requirements for press information since it believed that its
operations had to be maintained at maximum effort in order to
satisfy its own needs. 470/ This attitude made the prospect
of cooperation with FDD to eliminate waste and duplication
rather dim.

This is not to imply that no mutual solution of the
problem was sought. It was, however, characteristic of the
State Department to view its role in terms of its special de-
mands. It preferred to rely on its own press monitoring
facility devised for State needs, using FDD for materials not
covered by its system. It sought to avoid duplication but
on its own terms. For example, early in 1952, a series of
press reviews prepared by the US Embassy in Teheran with
accompanying newspapers was forwarded to FDD with the sugges-
tion that FDD, to save time, exploit only the articles not
done by the embassy. 471/ Unfortunately, many of the news-
papers were incomplete and others had entire articles missing,
thus drastically reducing their usefulness to the division. 472/

In connection with the HKPMS project, some progress toward coordination was made. In a 15 July 1954 meeting of John Bagnall and [   ] with State representatives, tentative agreement was reached on primary responsibility of FDD and HKPMS in the exploitation of Chinese-language publications by an assignment of publications and a division of labor. 473/ The arrangement was a step forward but apparently not a perfect solution, for in November 1956 [   ] still spoke of "trying for...years" to establish a proper liaison arrangement with HKPMS. On 1 July 1956, a mutual system of advance notice for long summaries or translations was instituted which it was hoped would eliminate duplication in all except short items. 474/ In the summer of 1957, [   ] visited Hong Kong and as a result of his conversations with consulate personnel there, the 1956 agreement was further refined. 475/ From then on, the FDD-HKPMS relationship was in close harmony. By mid-1958, some 259 Chinese Communist newspapers were being procured, of which 70 were regularly exploited under the joint arrangement. Procurement was regulated by weekly letters and lists. 476/ In July 1964, at [   ] initiative, one more change was instituted when the use of telegrams was substituted for letters in connection with important publications such as *Hung-ch'i* (Red Flag). 477/

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5. The Non-Intelligence Sector

A by-product of FDD's service to the intelligence com-
munity was its contribution to non-intelligence agencies and
offices in the government as well as to the US private sector,
the academic community and private industry in particular. As
in the case of its contact with the Allies, FDD's association
with the outside was not a one-way arrangement and the division

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derived much valuable assistance from non-government sources.

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Another valuable contribution to FDD operations was the large volume of source materials opened up to the division by the libraries of the various academic institutions and other depositories. These were made available to the intelligence community through the source surveys conducted by FDD in the early years. They have been discussed in an earlier chapter.

FDD's external contacts were by no means limited exclusively to the academic community. Its relationships with the outside ranged from private individuals, who requested or gave information, to the White House, which on occasion submitted special service requests. Contacts were also maintained with other non-intelligence organizations including government agencies such as the Interior Department's US Geological Survey, quasi-government or government-controlled (through contract) organizations such as the NSF, the Rand Corporation, and the Battelle Memorial Institute, and strictly private companies.

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On the higher levels, FDD had more than casual contact with the Congress and the White House. US Senators and Congressmen quite often directed questions or levied requests on the division through CIA liaison channels and the same was true of the White House staff. A few illustrative examples follow. In May 1960, FDD was asked for all available data concerning unrest in the USSR and the Satellites. The pertinent information, consisting of several hundred items, was employed in a speech by Senator Thomas J. Dodd (D., Conn.). 505/ At the end of September 1964, Presidential Assistant McGeorge Bundy requested an FDD foreign press survey of reaction to the Warren Report on the assassination of President Kennedy. This was accomplished on a priority basis. 506/

As a service organization, FDD was fully aware of the value of good public relations, particularly where the con- sumer controlled or influenced the purse string. In every instance in which a reasonable request was made, the division exhausted every effort to fulfill it. More often than not, it was able, by extra effort, to meet short deadlines.

Priority was always given to the requests of CIA Offices,
but in the interest of good will all consumer requirements
were serviced if at all possible.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

Translation Services

A. Early Contractual Translation: [   ] 25X1

   1. Background and Establishment

   In no part of FDD operations was the service aspect more
in evidence than in the division's translation function. It
formed a relatively small part of the workload -- only about 12
percent in 1950 507/ -- but it was, in contrast to the use of
exploitation guides, based entirely on direct requests from
consumer units and, to judge by the volume, constituted a not
insignificant contribution to their operations.

   From the beginning it had been evident that the demands
by Agency Offices for translation service were greater than
FDD's capacity to meet them. One principal problem, noted
earlier, was the considerable difficulty in recruiting qualified
linguists capable of being cleared. Recruitment continued
under this handicap, but it was recognized at an early date
that extraordinary measures would have to be adopted to re-
lieve the pressure of an inflated workload. The short-lived

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Translation Service Division in late 1947 and the so-called "overtime program" initiated in early 1948 were regarded as possible solutions, but their effect was temporary and their success minimal. Something more was needed.

It was at this point that a new concept, involving the use of contract translators to relieve FDB of part of its translation burden, was introduced. On 9 January 1948, Dr. Wallace R. Brode, Chief, Scientific Branch, ORE, called to John Bagnall's attention a Russian-born American marine engineer who had evinced an interest in doing translation work in his specialty. 508/ In FDB's view, the hiring of this man for contract work would initiate an entire new field of document exploitation and would require a policy decision by the DCI. 509/ OO agreed that an undertaking of this nature was contrary to current CIA policy, but if FDB wished to challenge the policy, the time appeared ripe to pursue the matter. Among the advantages of such an arrangement would be the availability of technical specialization, the non-necessity to clear personnel, and the possibility of mailing materials to specialists unwilling to come to Washington. The disadvantages were the absence of centralized control, the lack of security, and the creation of added administrative problems. It was estimated that the cost would amount to about $5.00 per page. 510/

Concurrent with the exchange on the feasibility of employ-
ing individual contractors, FDB initiated consideration of a
related plan involving the use of commercial translation
facilities in the United States. On 10 February 1948, Bagnall
proposed seeking relief by externally contracting with private
companies of this kind. 511/ Pursuing the proposal further,
the branch conducted a survey to determine the language
capabilities of all existing commercial translation agencies
in the United States, with special emphasis on those translating
the Russian language. Contact Branch was requested to collect
the pertinent data, including information on volume, page cost,
and time lag, and the result was a list of 230 individual
translation agencies in 53 American cities. 512/

Meanwhile, the proposal for the use of individual contract
employees was considered in more detail. On 11 February, on
the basis of an earlier memorandum from his deputy,   25X1
addressed a study to Gen. Sibert in which he presented the FDB
views on the proposal. His presentation was largely negative
and repeated in essence the list of disadvantages set forth in
the January OO memorandum. With the benefit of hindsight, one
can say that on one issue   miscalculated badly. He   25X1
presumed that because of security restrictions the amount of

work sent out on contract would be negligible, and that even if
the branch had a large amount of unclassified work, it was
questionable whether any of it would be of intelligence value.

[   ] concluded that as an adjunct of FDB, contract translation   25X1
was prohibitive in cost and impractical in operation. 513/

The issue of contractual translation to augment FDB
facilities had by now passed beyond the confines of the branch
and OO. A survey conducted in March 1948 by OCD on this
problem appeared to buttress [   ] view on the undesirability   25X1
of contractual translation 514/, but the AD/RE, commenting on
an A&M survey of FDB in early 1948 and basing his views on an
anticipated increase in ORE requirements, took the opposite
tack and recommended that FDB be given authority to enter into
contractual arrangements with outside agencies. 515/

Plans for improved translation service appeared to mark
time in 1949, but in the latter half of 1950, following the
start of the Korean War, the pressure from outside the division
increased and the demands for translation service by the several
CIA Offices were obviously greater than FDD could meet under
its existing T/O. With an estimated workload in excess of
70,000 pages of classified translation in prospect as a backlog
against the estimated requirements, a T/O increase [   ]   25X1
[   ] was approved early in 1951. 516/   25X1

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At the same time, the consumer offices foresaw a need for 37,000 pages of unclassified translation for the coming year and the demand for increased and improved FDD translation service was revived. In July 1950, [   ] the   **25X1**
Management Officer, recommended, among other things, FDD exploration of the possibility of establishing contracts with one or more private translating services for unclassified translation. 517/ John Bagnall, by now apparently resigned to the need for outside resources to help with the burgeoning unclassified translation load, demurred at the [   ] recom-   **25X1**
mendation and called attention to an FDD survey of commercial translating firms which revealed their prohibitive costs compared with FDD equivalents. He suggested two alternatives. One was a pitch for the augmented FDD T/O referred to above which was actually approved several months later; the other was a request that FDD be permitted to contract separately with competent individual translators on the outside as well as with certain Agency employees. He suggested a compensation rate of $3.00 per page (350 words). 518/

More discussion and paper-work on the external translation concept followed in the next few weeks. There was no longer a debate on the need for some arrangement, the problem now

concerned the nature and scope of such a facility. Finally,

on 19 September, George Carey submitted to the Management

Officer, the Inspection and Security Staff, and the Administra-

tive Staff copies of two proposals, drawn up by Bagnall,

offering alternative methods of using auxiliary facilities for

unclassified translation and requesting the addressee's

concurrence with one or the other.   25X1

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B. <u>Translation Coordination: The Central Foreign-Language Document Exploitation File and the Consolidated Translation Survey</u>

1. <u>Initiation</u>

Stimulated by the establishment of

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the USJPRS, the growth in FDD's translation activity increased greatly the importance of the division's coordination service in the intelligence community. A major role in the performance of this function was contributed by FDD's Records Branch through the medium of its Central Foreign-Language Document Exploitation File (DEX) and the monthly publication based on this file, the *Consolidated Translation Survey (CTS)*. A small rather unglamorous operation, the CTS/DEX had been set up in 1949 to prevent a potentially chaotic situation from developing in the intelligence community's translation operations. Based at the beginning on a small three-by-five card file on a requirements officer's desk, the CTS/DEX increased in size and developed by

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the end of FDD's life into a respected tool for translation

coordination with an index system which had referenced, by

author and source, more than 400,000 translations. 574/

Because of the many intangibles involved, it is diffi-

cult to establish with more than approximations the benefits

actually accruing to the community as a result of the CTS

function. However, after nearly 20 years of service, it is

estimated that the operation resulted in savings to the US

Government of some $7 million. Reference to its index files

during this span surfaced approximately 1.4 million pages

of foreign text proposed for translation that was already

available in English. 575/

This conservation of expense and effort was the tangible

result of the CTS/DEX operation. Much more difficult is the

computation of benefits realized through reference to its

monthly published listings which were used by more than

600 recipients in and outside the community. It is virtually

impossible to estimate the time saved by analysts in the

acquisition of desired translations or to apply a value figure

to the saving in time and effort of linguists who, through

the DEX file, were diverted from performing tasks already

accomplished, or to calculate the savings resulting from the

compilation of references to thousands of appropriate transla-
tions for analysts seeking information from foreign sources for
specific research projects.

In performing its anti-duplication function, the CTS/DEX
served as an important adjunct to the various document exploita-
tion committees periodically established by the intelligence
community to coordinate the work of foreign-language document
processing. While much duplication of effort was prevented by
these committees in the course of their regular meetings, the
CTS/DEX, in effect, served as their instrument to fulfill this
part of their function on a day-to-day basis.

At the same time, close liaison between desk-level
linguists and analysts and between supervisory personnel con-
tributed greatly toward reducing large-scale duplication of
translations. This often depended, however, on the memory of
individuals and was therefore untrustworthy. It was to assure
a reliable record of translations even at the most basic level,
that is, on single items or articles -- anything over three,
later five, pages -- some of which had been done months and even
years before, that the CTS/DEX came into play. It was a combi-
nation of all these efforts which reduced duplication to a
bare minimum.

The assignment of the community's translation coordination
function to FDD was a self-evident action, based as it was on

the generally accepted recognition of the division's common-concern mission. The operation was inherently so much a part of the document exploitation task that the need for some type of coordinating device was recognized early. FDD therefore acted informally on this matter long before official approval of the assignment was received in 1949.

As early as the summer of 1947, liaison activity with other translation operations of the intelligence community and in the government generally was initiated for the purpose of exchanging information concerning translation projects completed, in process, or planned by the various components involved. This liaison was conducted by ⬚

⬚ of FDB. It was ⬚ 25X1

25X11

who was to be most closely identified with the CTS/DEX program from then on.

The initial cooperation with FDB on this approach was that tendered by the Translation Section of the Army's Intelligence Division, which was the first to contribute monthly listings of its projects on a regular schedule. By the autumn of 1948, the branch also received monthly lists from ONI and A-2 on a purely voluntary cooperative basis.

The way was thus paved for FDB's immediate response to a 3 September 1948 AD/O directive which, in defining branch

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functions, called on FDB to coordinate with CIA offices and other government agencies in the continuing exploitation of foreign-language material. 576/ In reply to Carey, FDB Chief [   ] described his organization's plans to carry out 25X1

the coordination function and to maintain a central file for the information of the IAC agencies. He also proposed, for the first time, the regular publication of a "consolidated translation survey" listing all translations completed or in process during each preceding month. 577/ [   ] exchange with 25X1

Carey was followed by a period of preparation and planning in FDB for what was hoped to be the imminent start of a formal anti-duplication service for government agencies. Card files, cross-indexing the 3,000 to 4,000 items accumulated to date, were set up and a format for the proposed publication was formulated. However, personnel limitations and the lack of full cooperation and agreement of all IAC members and their components delayed the start of the project at full operational efficiency for another year. Lack of community response re-sulted in large part from the fact that the need for coordination and protection against duplication had become involved with the discussions then underway in the intelligence community on the feasibility of a "central translation" facility.

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However, the operational plan for the CTS/DEX proposed by
[ ] and the planned format were not wasted but served as
guidelines when the service was eventually opened.

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Although no one really opposed the CTS/DEX plan, the
debate on the central translation center concept dragged on
and the delay continued. A break in the log-jam occurred
finally on 10 February 1949. A "Symposium on Translations"
under the auspices of the Special Committee on Technical
Information, National Military Establishment, Research and
Development Board, convened on that day with some 20 govern-
ment organizations, including FDB, in attendance. 578/ While
the participants, who included representatives from all areas
of government interested in translation and foreign-language
source materials, largely insisted that the activities of
their respective organizations precluded surrender of their
own translation services even if a centralized facility were
established, all strongly endorsed a central clearing house
for information on availability of translations completed and
in process. This approbation of the CTS/DEX concept was
based on an awareness of the extreme shortage of linguists,
especially in certain languages, and the need therefore to
conserve limited manpower by preventing duplication. The
Symposium expressed itself as favoring a central card file,

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modest at first with expansion in the future if the experiment
proved successful, and the regularized contribution of pertinent
information by each agency. It was proposed that the central
file be maintained by the Library of Congress, but the Library
representative, citing the lack of personnel and funds for
such a project, put a damper on this suggestion.

On 16 March 1949, as a follow-up to the Symposium delibera-
tions, Adm. Hillenkoetter, the DCI, addressed a memorandum to
the Standing Committee of the IAC in which he referred to
Carey's 3 September 1948 directive as well as to an OO memo-
randum of 7 March 1949 on "Central Service and Coordination of
Translation." In respect to translation coordination,
Hillenkoetter noted the desirability of CIA carrying out this
coordination by the maintenance of a central translation file
of intelligence material and the periodic dissemination to all
agencies of a consolidated list of translations in process
and completed. At the same time, he recommended formation of
a new committee, to be designated the "Committee on Exploitation
of Foreign-Language Documents" (CEFLD), to replace the existing
Ad Hoc Committee on Translations. 579/ This memorandum,
written in the passive form and reading as though it were
merely suggestive, was a tactful effort to achieve the central
coordination of intelligence translation activities amid the

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rivalries, jealousies, and fancied prerogatives of government departments. It produced results within a month.

On 11 April 1949, the Committee on Translations met for the last time, establishing as its successor the committee suggested by the DCI but calling it the "Ad Hoc Committee on Exploitation of Foreign Documents" (CEFD). Meeting weekly from 18 April until its demise in July in favor of a permanent exploitation committee*, the new ad hoc committee took immediate steps to study the coordination problem by designating a Subcommittee on the Coordination of Foreign Documents Translation. 580/

The movement toward centralized translation coordination was now well underway and received further impetus with the concurrence on 25 April 1949 of the armed services departmental intelligence chiefs to the DCI's 16 March proposal that translation coordination rest with CIA/FDB. 581/

Finally, on 27 June the Coordination Subcommittee, consisting of Theodore M. Nordbeck of the State Department and ☐ of FDB, reported back to the CEFD on its deliberations relating to the problem for which the subcommittee had been established. This report spelled out

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* See Ch. Nine.

in detail the policies and procedures to be employed by FDB
in coordinating translation activities for the CIA and
the IAC agencies and represented, in effect, a charter for this
activity. As formulated, the recommendations of the sub-
committee yielded a considerable degree of authority to FDB
for maintenance of a strict regime in translation control.
The IAC agencies were, for example, required to keep the branch
informed on all translation initiated and completed, and no
translations were to be undertaken without prior clearance
from FDB. Furthermore, the branch was to be furnished a copy
of every translation completed. 582/ The blueprint established
by the subcommittee was, of course, an ideal and its attain-
ment throughout the intelligence community was met only
gradually and after some change and concession.

On the basis of the subcommittee's suggestions, the CEFD
itself, before its final adjournment on 25 July, submitted
several major recommendations to Chief, FDB, for official IAC
concurrence. The first of these was the proposal that CIA
assume responsibility for the overall coordination of foreign-
language document exploitation. 583/ The approval of this
recommendation formalized the procedures in translation con-
trol already practiced by FDB and set the stage for a full-
scale operation.

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With the establishment of the Records Section in the
new Reports Division in the August 1949 reorganization of the
branch, the additional personnel made available to the new
division permitted greater flexibility of assignment, and the
orderly establishment of the Document Exploitation File in
its complete cross-index form was achieved. The reorganization
and the increased T/O also prepared the way for the monthly
publication of the IAC translation efforts. The first
Consolidated Translation Survey, published in the regular   25X1
report format, was issued on 18 October 1949. It was a 17-page
report, covering entries recorded to date in the DEX file,
and consisted of 233 items, the majority of them completed by
FDD, the balance by the Army, Navy, and State Departments.

The first CTS was a trial issue, but the new publication
was almost immediately adopted as a formal publication of
FDD. On 28 October, George Carey proposed to the Management
Staff the regular monthly publication and dissemination of
the CTS to the IAC agencies, citing its value to recipients
both as a reference work and as a medium for prevention of
duplication. 584/ This was approved and the next listing was
published on 23 November as Number 1 of the new series. Its
classification at this time was "Secret" and it was so published
until 1959. With the addition of the AEC to the list of

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contributors and users of the CTS, the distribution of the

new publication was increased to 104 subscribers. Early in

April 1950, a monthly supplement to the basic CTS was initiated

and classified "Secret - Control/US Officials Only" to cover

the listing of items which were not to be made available to

By then   25X1

these organizations contributed regularly to the CTS and

received copies of the "Secret" publication. 585/ In the

course of development, the CTS/DEX increased the number of its

contributors from the original three (the Departments of the

Army, Navy, and State) noted in its initial publication to

about 450. Of this number, at least 100 could be depended

upon for consistent contribution. 586/

It is of interest at this point to note, as indicative

of less-than-enthusiastic support elsewhere in the Agency for

the FDD-sponsored translation coordination, the footnotes

attending the concurrences of the 28 October Carey memorandum.

James M. Andrews, the AD/CD, in signing on 2 November, com-

mented as follows: "Believe ultimately we may find a more

economical way of doing this job - possibly by machine methods.

This proposal, however, seems unexceptionable to meet an urgent

interim need."   of the Management Staff   25X1

stated on 3 November: "Management would like to have a try

at finding an easier way to produce in near future." This
doubt as to the efficacy of the FDD coordination system
doubtless had substance. The manually-serviced DEX system
was a laborious operation at best and required the time-
consuming participation of most of the clerical staff in the
Records Division. Often the staff was able to maintain currency
only through the use of considerable amounts of overtime.
However, while the application of machine methods to the
operation appeared logical, the theory and practice of this
technique was still in its infancy, and the application of such
methods to the CTS/DEX for the time being remained only a
resolution.

Despite its humble beginning and the drawback of its
burdensome method, the operation progressed. By mid-1952, the
DEX file contained references to 20,000 translations cross-
indexed by author, source, and the beginnings of a key-word
subject file, accounting in all for an accumulation of more
than 75,000 cards. 587/ To illustrate the tremendous growth
of the operation, let us point out that in 1953 the file had
increased to over 63,000 referenced translations -- at a rate
of approximately 12,000 items a year -- recorded on 125,000
cards, 588/ and by 1955 these respective statstics had
grown to 74,000 items recorded on 242,000 cards. 589/ Five

years later, in 1960, the file contained nearly 180,000

references 590/ and by 1962, about a quarter million. The

growth rate of the DEX in 1962 had reached almost 200 items a

day. 591/

Meanwhile, the CTS showed a concomitant growth. From

the small 17-page publication listing 233 items and distributed

to 104 consumers mentioned above, the publication had come to

serve 236 consumers by June 1952. 592/ By 1955, the CTS

averaged 115 pages a month, listed more than 900 items, and

was disseminated to 300 consumers in the intelligence com-

munity. 593/ By 1962, an average issue ran to over 300 pages

of current listings and was distributed in more than 700

copies. 594/ In May 1962, a 423-page CTS was published,

the largest issued up to that time. 595/ A further indication

of growth was the fact that near the end of 1955 the number

of units of the IAC membership participating in the coordina-

tion effort had grown from the original four to 19. In

addition, all available listings of other governmental,

institutional, industrial, and commercial translations   25X1

_____ were   25X1

obtained for incorporation in the CTS, thus making it a

highly effective device for avoiding duplication. 596/

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2. Expansion

The magnitude of the translation coordination function undertaken by FDD is readily evident from the foregoing statistics. Yet, as of the beginning of 1952, the CTS/DEX operation was conducted without the exclusive assignment of any specialists to it. The work was carried out on a part-time basis with the clerical personnel of the Reports Branch's Composition and Layout Section frequently called upon to help the Records Section people keep the index current. As an interim *modus operandi* this arrangement was adequate, but it was neither orderly nor dependable, particularly in the matter of meeting monthly deadlines for publication of the CTS.

In May 1952, a survey of the CTS/DEX operation was made as part of a larger study on FDD and tentative plans were drawn up for the expansion of this service. 597/ In September, the FDD T/O was increased by ⬛ to establish, among other requirements, a permanent translation anti-duplication unit. The increase in positions resulted in the assignment of four slots to a new organization which was designated the CTS Unit. It was attached to the Composition and Layout Section, now redesignated the Composition and Survey Section, and was placed under ⬛ who directed its activities for the next 15 years. 598/ With the permanent establishment

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of the CTS Unit, full-time operation was possible for the
first time in the four years of the project's development.

The creation of a permanent organizational entity for
the CTS/DEX operation permitted more orderly planning, work
scheduling, and personnel assignment than was possible under
earlier conditions. The clerical personnel assigned to the
new unit were those who, on the basis of their previous
part-time participation in the project, were the most experienced
in anti-duplication operations. New methods to apply the
greatest efficiency and practicality to the system were also
adopted. After some study and experimentation, the filing
system was standardized on an alphabetical basis for all
categories of the index. The decision to avoid the use of
conventional library numeric and decimal classification systems
was intentional; there was and would be no time to train
personnel in their use nor to properly apply these methods if
they were adopted. In the long run this decision proved a
wise one since it simplified the work of inexperienced em-
ployees assigned to the unit.

Expansion of CTS/DEX coverage to non-IAC and non-
government translation activities was now feasible. Thus,
following a preliminary discussion with Contact Division on
this subject, John Bagnall formally approached Chief, CD,

in March 1953 and requested assistance in expanding the scope of the CTS/DEX effort. He considered it desirable to include other government agencies and non-government organizations that were commercially or academically engaged in the translation of foreign-language documents. He initiated contact with non-IAC agencies, such as the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Interior, through Liaison Division, OCD, and requested help from Contact Division in reaching all non-government organizations. 599/ Contact Division agreement to this arrangement was prompt and it continued with great effectiveness from then on. The support received through CD from external translators rose rapidly from no items in 1952 to 162 items in 1953 and to 310 in 1954. 600/

One of the first of the external sources exploited was

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
These were translations completed by or for some
of the larger corporations and academic institutions in the
United States. The ___ collection had been started in 1946, but

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a great number of the translations antedated 1940. These

references were carded and added to the file; they swelled the

CTS Index by more than 1,000 items. 601/

The Index expanded rapidly. Already in 1953, for ex-

ample, the results of external translation projects conducted

by the National Science Foundation were regularly processed.

Liaison with the National Institutes of Health resulted in

listings from this source, and similar contact with the

Scientific Translation Center of the Library of Congress

developed regular receipt of translation bibliographies.

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3. Operations

Once the CTS/DEX function was expanded and fully

organized, its continued development was distinguished more

in featured accomplishments and improvements in techniques and

services than in other forms of progress. Among the services

rendered was assistance to consumers in preliminary research.

Agency analysts called upon the CTS staff to assist in compiling

lists of translations on particular subjects as source material

for research projects. The compilation of these "subject

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runs," as they were known to the staff, was time-consuming, but the service was considered part of the CTS function although secondary to the prevention of duplication. The number of requests for such surveys averaged about 40 a year and reached as many as 104 only once. In 1964, due to a reduction in personnel [   ] on the CTS staff, the subject index had to be abandoned. This curtailed the search operation, but survey requests were still honored thereafter on an "as possible" basis using the existing files. 603/

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The need to service the subject runs more expeditiously was one of the reasons for investigating the early possibility of automating the Index. Already in 1953, FDD had as an objective eventually to convert the CTS to a machine-record operation. 604/ To establish a base for this change, as well as to deposit a vital record copy of the file in the Agency archives, the CTS Unit in 1953 established a serially numbered file for all indexed items. The advantage of this file was to make resort to the working file unnecessary should the CTS ever be processed into machine language. However, surveys conducted by the Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Staff up to and during OCR's Project CHIVE (1963-1966) revealed that automation could not be satisfactorily or economically applied to the comparatively small CTS operation.

With the probability of automation discouragingly remote, in 1959 FDD acted at least to modernize the index filing system and realign the physical equipment and working space of the operation for smoother work-flow control and efficiency. Two Rotofiles for file cards were acquired and a secure area con- structed to accommodate the operation; cumbersome safes were replaced with light-weight card-file cabinets. The more orderly file arrangement thus afforded contributed to a reduc- tion by half in the amount of overtime required to maintain the service on a current basis. When the CTS/DEX was moved to the Matomic Building in January 1961, four additional Rotofiles were added to the equipment.

From the start, aggressive liaison by FDD officers had contributed greatly to cooperation between the CTS staff and various government agencies. By 1955-1956, the increase in commercial, institutional, and industrial translation activities had made it imperative that the anti-duplication operation be alert to and acquire any translations which would be available to the government and thus avoid the possibility of unnecessary and expensive translation by a government unit where this could be avoided.   25X1

                                                                              25X1

                                                    The output of   25X1

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commercial translation firms was generally made known to the

CTS staff by direct mail notices or through catalogues and

advertising. The SLA's *Translation Monthly*, a listing of

translations acquired by the SLA Translation Center, was also

screened for items not previously covered by the CTS. The

translations from all these sources were for the most part,

but not exclusively, on scientific and technical subjects.

A typical example of the CTS staff's contact with a

commercial translation firm was one initiated, through CD,

in late 1954. In reply to a CD query about FDD interest in

the output of the firm of [blank]   25X1

[blank] Bagnall requested regular acquisition of the   25X1

[blank] listings for inclusion in the Index. Though listed   25X1

by the Scientific Translation Center of the Library of Congress,

direct receipt of these listings would enable CTS to report

them more promptly. 605/ CD did as Bagnall had requested and

the [blank] translations were from then on more or less ir-   25X1

regularly recorded in the CTS.

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The effectiveness of the CTS was in direct ratio to the speed with which translation information was transmitted to FDD by the CTS subscribers. This fact was underscored by a CIA complaint in 1955 that the 6004th AISS, an Army translation unit, had from time to time translated an entire book or lengthy pamphlet which FDD had also processed. While the CTS listed the work in progress at FDD, the delayed receipt of the CTS listing often failed to prevent this duplicative effort. 610/ With the initiation of the more rapid teletype communication, such duplication was eventually eliminated.

In 1959, arrangements were made for FBIS to provide the use of its teletype facilities for the quick exchange of translation information between FDD and the US Army Command Reconnaissance Activity Pacific in Tokyo. At the same time, agreement was reached for the Press Monitoring Unit (PMU), US Consulate General, Hong Kong, to keep CTS informed of its translations.

Cooperation by and with the AEC's Division of Technical Information at Oak Ridge and the Air Force's Foreign Technology Division (FTD) at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base also developed as the CTS expanded. Teletype communication for transmitting listings and for servicing inquiries was established in 1961, first

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through the use of CD communication and later via direct
receipt through the FBIS communication network. 611/

In addition to the organizations already mentioned,
there were numerous other faithful supporters of the CTS/DEX
operation, including the Office of the Army Assistant Chief
of Staff, Intelligence, the National Institutes of Health,
the Aeronautical Chart and Information Center, the Army Map
Service, the US Weather Bureau, and the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration. The NSF was also an early contact,
and when in 1960 NSF assumed responsibility for coordinating
the use of US counterpart funds (PL 480) for translations
abroad, it called upon the CTS to ensure that requested
translations were not duplicative. This practice, with the
Office of Technical Services of the Commerce Department handling
requests, became standard procedure and prevented the needless
expenditure of thousands of dollars.

Suggestions for a more sophisticated format for the
CTS were received from time to time, involving such consumer
requests as more detailed area and subject breakdowns, a de-
tailed subject index for each issuance, and a cumulative author
index. The possibility of applying the Intelligence Subject
Code to each listed entry was also explored.

The unavailability of adequate and trained personnel

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militated against compliance with most of these requests.
In 1958, an abortive attempt was made to compile a cumula-
tive author index. This effort was revived in July 1959 and,
with the aid of considerable overtime, an index of the first
18 issues of the unclassified CTS was disseminated in January
1960. This was enthusiastically received by consumer organiza-
tions, but the heavy burden entailed in its preparation resulted
in the eventual discontinuance of the cumulative author index.

A problem of some concern to FDD in the late 1950s was
the growing demand for the CTS and the burgeoning number of
copies that had to be prepared and disseminated. As indicated
previously, the CTS for January 1958 was issued for the first
time as an "unclassified" publication. This development was an
outgrowth of the furor created over the alleged education gap in
the United States at the time of the orbiting of the Soviet
"Sputnik." It was decided to conform to the government's objec-
tive of making as much government-compiled information as possible
available to the industrial and academic sectors of the country.
With CD using 150 copies for *quid-pro-quo* exchange and the AEC
requiring about 100 copies for its facilities, the press run
of the unclassified CTS swelled to more than 700 copies monthly.
At the same time, classified information was covered in two

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other issuances, one "Confidential" and the other "Secret/Noforn,"
with distribution of these editions restricted to the intelli-
gence organizations. In December 1962, to discourage any
further increase in dissemination, the "For Official Use Only"
control was applied to the unclassified issue, eventually reduc-
ing its distribution to something over 600 copies. 612/

Many individuals, institutions, and corporations from
outside the intelligence community and the government attempted
to be placed on the CTS "subscription list." Frequently, all
back issues of the publication were also solicited. Requests
of this nature were usually generated by government contractors
or consultants who had been made acquainted with the listings
by their contracting agencies. Such cases were handled by
referring the requester to his contract office or turning them
over to CD for disposition as appropriate.

At the beginning of 1958, the Commerce Department's
Office of Technical Services, later redesignated the Clearinghouse
for Scientific and Technical Information (CFSTI), expanded its
operations to include the indexing and twice-monthly listing
of all S&T translations. The medium for this was a new publica-
tion entitled *Technical Translations,* which was to include
abstracts of all the listed items. Since it was felt that the
CTS and the *Technical Translations* would be duplicative in the

S&T field, FDD resolved, as of 1 January 1959 when OTS could

assure complete coverage in this field, to discontinue listing

the same items in the CTS and to confine the latter's coverage

to political, military, and those economic fields not covered

by OTS. 613/ Besides avoiding duplicate listings, issuance of

the *Technical Translations* also gave promise of reducing by

about 40 percent the CTS monthly workload, which by this time

averaged upwards of 3,000 new entries every month. To cope

with it required supplemental assistance and considerable

overtime for the unit of four clerks.

The first issue of *Technical Translations* under the new

plan was published on 2 January 1959 and it appeared semi-

monthly thereafter until its discontinuance on 30 December 1967

when another, somewhat altered, Clearinghouse publication took

its place. However, the OTS objective of supplanting the S&T

part of the CTS with its own publication was never achieved

because the *Technical Translations* operation never satisfactorily

demonstrated that it could adequately service the intelligence

community. Members of the latter, represented on the CEFLP,

on 16 January 1959 recommended that, as a minimum, the CTS

be continued until the OTS publication had proved itself and

also urged that consideration be given to indefinite continua-

tion of the CTS as an intelligence publication meeting specific

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intelligence needs. 614/ Because of the lack of confidence

of consumers in the OTS publication, FDD made no change in the

CTS report and continued to issue S&T listings as before.

Cooperation between the CTS staff and CFSTI remained

close, with the former initially providing the OTS unit with

index card copies of all current unclassified listings received

by FDD. This practice was discontinued after eight months

when OTS decided that the CTS cards were no longer needed for

the *Technical Translations*. As had been its practice with

the SLA *Translation Monthly*, which the *Technical Translations*

had replaced, the CTS staff continued to screen the *Technical*

Translations listings. On an average, 90 percent of the

items in the latter had previously been listed in the CTS. 615/

In July 1966, an economic retrenchment revived once

again the plan for a CTS-*Technical Translations* merger. FDD

was faced with a personnel reduction and CFSTI was also seeking

ways of meeting a budget cut. Again the alleged duplication of

two organizations listing translations was labeled an unneces-

sary luxury and became a target of the budget-cutters. At the

instigation of CFSTI, negotiations were instituted on 26 October

with the objective of merging the two operations under the

auspices of the Washington office of USJPRS. This seemed an

appropriate move since the JPRS operated under the cover of

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and in cooperation with CFSTI. 616/ The proposal was debated for several months but no final action was taken. The early months of 1967 found FDD preoccupied with its imminent transfer from OCR and assimilation by FBIS. Although the CFSTI-CTS merger was still being considered, it was actually dormant. On 31 December, CFSTI terminated the *Technical Translations* operation, and the CTS/DEX function continued as before.

The CTS/DEX project was a function which outlived FDD as an independent organization and as of this writing continues intact. This fact alone is evidence of the operation's benefit to the intelligence community during its lengthy existence. As an anti-duplication device the Central Translation Index and its monthly publication, the *Consolidated Translation Survey*, has from a monetary standpoint more than fulfilled the expectation held for it and, even at a minimum, has saved the Agency thousands of dollars in unnecessary translation work. From its beginning in 1949 and down to the end of the period being treated, it was a primitive undertaking, depending in large part on brute-force human manipulation. It is unfortunate that the methods employed were never converted to machine operations, for it is likely that, had this been accomplished, the effectiveness and economy of the system would have been even greater.

CHAPTER NINE

A New Charter

A. First Steps

This history so far has repeatedly emphasized the basic

theme of "service of common concern" in intelligence affairs,

one of the major objectives for which CIG, and then CIA, came

into existence. After President Truman established the National

Intelligence Organization in early 1946, the National Intelligence

Authority (NIA) was organized and, through the medium of a

series of directives, it authorized specific intelligence

functions to be performed by CIG in carrying out its mission.

The National Security Act was signed in July 1947 and in the

following September the National Security Council (NSC) was

set up. By the same act CIA replaced CIG. In the course of

time many of NIA's actions were revised and consolidated into

National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCID) which,

with appropriate Director of Central Intelligence Directives

(DCID), refined the old NIA directives in the light of experience

gained by the new organization. The effect of the new NSCIDs

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and DCIDs was to give legal authority to the functions performed by the new Agency and to serve as charters for the operating components of the organization.

To the extent that the "common concern" rubric pertained to the exploitation of foreign-language publications -- initially captured documents and subsequently current materials -- FDD also entered the picture. The logic of performing document exploitation as a common service -- in the light of limited sources and manpower and to obviate the possibility of labor being lost through repetitious duplication -- has been cited frequently in the foregoing pages. It would appear that this aspect of intelligence operations would have been easily formalized from the start. Unfortunately, this was not the case. Although many of the new NSCIDs were drawn up and authorized soon after passage of the National Security Act, the formulation of a charter for foreign-language document exploitation languished for almost six years. The reason was, to a large extent, the reluctance of established intelligence units to surrender organizational prerogatives. Although the common-concern concept of handling foreign-language document operations in a central area received general acceptance in the intelligence community, there was continuing disagreement on the part of members of the IAC on how much of this function

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they should give up. Such problems as publications procurement
and allocation and departmental responsibilities prevented final
acceptance by other agencies of the various attempts by CIA to
draft an NSCID on this subject. The causes for delay seem
petty in retrospect, but in the early period of trial and error
they appeared to be of sufficient importance to the community
members to cause them to move slowly before making commitments
and to create disruptions if they felt it necessary. This
maneuvering resulted in a plethora of draft directives, many
of which differed from predecessor versions only in minute
changes in words or phrases designed to convey slight differences
of meaning so as to favor the one who had submitted the revision.

In the meanwhile, within the limits allowed by a general
understanding among members of the IAC, FDD performed many of
the functions of a "common-service" organization and operated
on a practical, if not wholly legal, ad hoc basis. This arrange-
ment was not a total success, but as an interim measure it was
workable and the division adjusted to it as best it could.

The long drawn-out process of formulating an NSCID to
cover foreign-language document exploitation was initiated on
15 October 1947 by Donald D. Edgar, Chief of ICAPS, with a
general memorandum to the Assistant Directors and the General
Counsel calling for a study and discussion of drafts of the

various proposed NSCIDs. 617/ Among these was one authorizing

the centralization of services of common concern and including

the exploitation for intelligence purposes of captured and

other foreign documents, including press and periodicals.

Based on the October ICAPS memorandum and on subsequent

discussions, a proposed NSCID 8 on document exploitation was

initially drawn up on 13 January 1948 and submitted to ICAPS

for discussion in an ad hoc committee of the IAC. The objections

by the Army representative on this committee resulted in the

preparation of a new draft on 3 March 1948 and its submission

to the Standing Committee of the IAC. The new version of the

NSCID foundered on the small, two-letter word "or" in a phrase

pertaining to current documents which provided for exploitation

of such current publications "as are required for national

intelligence purposes *or* as may be agreed upon with the

interested agencies." The Departments of State and Air Force

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished to change the word "or"

to read "and" or "if." Use of either of these words would have

altered the intent of the sentence considerably. Prescott Childs,

successor to Edgar as Chief of ICAPS, felt there was no point

in approving a directive which would require a separate agree-

ment to implement each project taken up under it. He therefore

proposed abandoning the effort to obtain a directive and letting

FDB continue to operate under working level arrangements within

the authority of the existing NSCID 3.* 618/

There the matter rested through the summer of 1948.

However, as mentioned earlier,** several of the IAC agencies

had begun to show interest in the idea of CIA undertaking a

central translation service. On 3 September, Childs presented

the question to the IAC Standing Committee members. 619/ Their

decision resulted in the formation of an Ad Hoc Committee on

Central Translation. On 11 April 1949 this committee concluded

that a central translation bureau was impracticable due to each

agency's desire to maintain its own translation section. However,

it did agree that a common service for exploitation of foreign-

language publications would be desirable. The outcome was the

establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Exploitation of Foreign

Documents. On 25 July it submitted the following recommendations:

(1) CIA should assume responsibility for over-all coordination of

foreign-language document exploitation and for performance of

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* NSCID 3 "Coordination of Intelligence Production" gave the
branch no clear authority to centralize the exploitation of
foreign publications. It did, however, assign major responsi-
bility for production of basic intelligence to CIA and, in the
absence of a more precise definition of its mission, FDB had
functioned under the aegis of this directive since its inception.

** Cf. Ch. Three, p. 75.

such exploitation centrally as might be necessary to meet the
requirements of the IAC agencies; (2) a permanent Foreign
Document Exploitation Committee should be established; (3) each
IAC member could retain, at its discretion, a translating and/or
abstracting unit and inform the DCI of such exploitation to
prevent duplication, and (4) an NSCID should be formulated
embodying the above recommendations. 620/ The committee further
drafted a proposed NSCID conforming to the specifications cited.
This proposal was subsequently redrafted by OO to afford greater
protection and leeway for CIA in view of budget limitations,
and on 26 September the new draft was submitted by Chief, ICAPS,
to the IAC Standing Committee members with a request for con-
currence. 621/

Despite the apparent accord by IAC representatives in
the CEFD, the proposed draft NSCID of 26 September raised a
new flurry of disagreements. On 7 and 11 October, replies to
the Childs memorandum were received from the Army and Navy,
respectively, requesting certain changes in the NSCID draft,
and on 14 October John Bagnall, through the AD/O, submitted
to Childs a critique rejecting some and accepting others of
the changes sought by the Army and Navy. Bagnall objected
most strenuously to their request that the decision on what

was to be exploited be subjected to mutual agreement between
the DCI and the IAC members. This wording, he felt, amounted
to declaring open season on FDD and threatened the division
with an inundation of exploitation work. He stated his belief
that budget and T/O limitations required that the DCI exercise
sole judgment as to what work was to be accepted by FDD and
what was not. In view of the apparent conflict, Carey called
for a reconvening of the committee to re-draft the proposal
for an NSCID. 622/

This request was buttressed the following day by the
arrival of an NSCID version from State which in effect backed
up the Army and Navy requests for mutual decision on exploita-
tion. 623/ In reply Carey repeated his earlier objections
about overloading FDD and made the further point that, because
the requesting agency, lacking adequate language competence,
had little or no knowledge of the substantive content of
documents sent to FDD, it was therefore in no position to
judge their intelligence value. Therefore reservation of the
DCI's right of decision in reference to each request as well
as to establish priorities was imperative. 624/

The bickering continued. A new working version of an
NSCID was drafted and circulated on 25 October by Prescott
Childs, but it too encountered opposition, this time from the

Air Force, which, in its reply on 15 November, requested a minor change in wording. 625/ A revised version was issued on 18 November. This time the State Department and the Army objected; in fact the Army dissent was an outright rejection of the draft because the provisions it had requested in October were not included. 626/

Anxious to obtain an approved NSCID, Carey conceded some justice to the State and Army pleas for mutual agreement on requirements and submitted a fifth proposal on 2 December incorporating the points made by the dissenters. 627/ This new draft was circulated to the IAC members on 6 December but it again failed to win approval, this time as a result of renewed Air Force disagreement. 628/

The limit of patience on this matter had been reached and Childs suggested to Carey that it be closed out, at least temporarily. Since multilateral agreement on an exploitation charter was apparently impossible in light of the mood of at least three of the seven IAC members, Childs suggested a continuation of the ad hoc bilateral relationships under which FDD had been operating. 629/ There the matter rested and no new initiatives were attempted for the next year and a half.

The intractability of the dissenting IAC members in connection with this important problem is somewhat difficult

to fathom. The need for central control of foreign-language

document exploitation was obvious and, as such, was conceded.

The difficulty lay primarily in the over-solicitous attitude

toward established prerogatives, many related to war-time

experiences. In the course of time, and largely due to CIA-FDD

efforts to allay suspicions of empire-building motivations on

the part of the Agency, this attitude gradually changed. As

the confidence of consumer agencies in FDD's intentions and

capabilities was strengthened and the purposes of its mission

were clarified, the way was made easier for the formulation of

a charter. The process, however, was slow and, after the

matter was revived, still required another two years to come

to fruition.

B.   Second Effort

The question of a charter for FDD document exploitation

was revived in early 1951, following a Management Staff study

of the division issued on 1 December 1950 which, among other

recommendations, urged the formulation of an NSCID to define

the "common-concern" responsibilities of the organization. 630/

On 29 March 1951, Lawrence K. White, Acting AD/O, reopened the

question in a memorandum to the AD/IC requesting that the

problem be taken up once again with the IAC members. In

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justifying the urgent need for a new NSCID to cover FDD

operations, White reviewed at considerable length the division's

common-service activity since its inception in 1947 and also

the steps taken since then to seek a formula of agreement on

the requested charter. 631/

 As a preliminary to White's initiative, a proposed draft

directive had been drawn up by the ad hoc committee in February

which, in view of the difficulties encountered earlier, had

been given careful study by OO and FDD. During the course of

this perusal, [   ] of the OO P&C Staff suggested that   25X1

in light of pending plans of the armed services pertaining to

captured document exploitation,* the new directive specifically

exclude the exploitation of captured documents from the scope

of the proposed NSCID. She felt that the military services

would immediately suspect that the new draft NSCID was a ruse

to circumvent ASDIC, and thus the new version would encounter

the same opposition that its predecessors had and the possibility

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* That is, plans for the formation of a new facility to be
designated the Armed Services Document Intelligence Center
(ASDIC). For a fuller treatment of this facility, see Chapter XII
below.

of its acceptance would be in similar jeopardy. 632/ The AD/O

concurred with ⬚ views, and as a result the   25X1

23 February draft was appropriately altered prior to its sub-

mission on 29 March.

A meeting of the CEFD members was convened on 1 May to

study the new OO draft and once again the intelligence community

began a round of discussion, counter-proposal, and dissent

similar to that it had engaged in two years earlier. The Air

Force representatives requested a change in the wording of the

CIA draft, but no solution was reached at the initial meeting.

A few days later Bagnall and the Air Force members met and

agreed upon changes amending one paragraph. Following this,

the Advisor for Management and the Assistant Deputy (Administra-

tion) objected to the entire proposal. 633/

This set-back resulted in the preparation of another

paper by George Carey, with FDD's assistance, which was

presented to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI)

on 23 July 1951 and submitted to the DCI and all CIA Directorates

and Offices a week later. In it Carey once more covered in

considerable detail the background of FDD's common-service

evolvement, enumerated the by-now-well-known reasons for central

exploitation, and cited the advantages of an NSCID to cover

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this operation. To this memorandum was attached a new proposal for an NSCID incorporating language which took into account all objections made up to that time. 634/ The Carey version elicited an objection from the AD/CD on grounds that the draft, as written, would hamper the procurement of foreign-language documents by other IAC agencies, 635/ but for the moment further action on the NSCID project was suspended. Approval of the Carey paper was withheld pending completion of the survey of OO then under-way by the Senior Consultant to the DCI, William H. Jackson.

In his report, which he submitted to the DCI on 13 November 1951, Jackson expressed the opinion that the issuance of a directive on FDD operations would have a number of advantages, including the legalization of a *de facto* situation, an easing of FDD's procurement problem, and more effective coordination of foreign document exploitation by the IAC agencies. For this reason he advocated that Carey's draft directive be presented to the IAC. 636/

This recommendation in the Jackson Survey was among those approved in February 1952, and the Office of Intelligence Coordination (OIC) and FDD took immediate action to redraft an NSCID based on the 23 July proposal. This rendition was referred to ORR, OSI, and OCD for concurrence preparatory to its submission to the IAC agencies for formal discussion. 637/

At this point OSI introduced a new factor which threatened to further delay the negotiations. During March 1952, the NSCID draft for FDD remained in OIC pending submission of a new directive which OSI was in the process of drafting. OO was informed of the OSI initiative by a 21 March memorandum which served as a cover for the draft of a study on Russian scientific literature. To the latter were attached a report on Soviet scientific materials by Prof. John Turkevich of Princeton University and two tabs. The draft study dealt with practical means of handling the general problem of acquiring, processing, and exploiting Russian scientific publications for intelligence purposes. Tab A consisted of a draft Executive Order designed to place primary responsibility for overall planning and coordination for the handling of Russian scientific literature under the aegis of the National Science Foundation. Of interest to the subject of this chapter, however, was the fact that Tab B represented a draft NSCID designed to establish the responsibility -- within the limited viewpoint of OSI interests -- for planning and coordination of the intelligence aspects of the problem in CIA. 638/ The OSI proposal had a major fault; it was limited solely to *Russian* and *scientific* literature. John Bagnall objected to this restriction. He also took issue with

the proposed dispersal of functions which defeated the purpose

of "centralizing" document processing that an NSCID was intended

to bring about, and with the fact that the proposal benefitted

the US scientific community and not US intelligence as such. 639/

In short, an NSCID cast in these terms would have served OSI

interests well, but largely to the exclusion of the rest of

the intelligence community. The OSI draft NSCID received no

support. In a subsequent meeting with ⬚   25X1

⬚ OSI representatives agreed that the NSCID,   25X1

whatever its eventual content, should not be confined exclusively

to scientific or to Russian literature. 640/

Another sideshow in the slow process of developing a

directive was that offered by the Foreign Language Working

Group (FLWG) established by the Economic Intelligence Committee's

Subcommittee on Requirements and Facilities for Collation in

July 1952 under the chairmanship of ⬚ The FLWG   25X1

was set up to determine the most efficient means of dealing

with the procurement, exploitation, and referencing of foreign-

language publications. 641/ After several meetings, the group

issued a final report on 27 October 1952 in which it pointed

out in considerable detail the faults and weaknesses of the

existing system of foreign-language document handling. In

addition it discussed solutions to these problems and drew up
recommendations for the subcommittee. Among others, these
included establishment of a common-concern organization and
also a Foreign Language Board consisting of a representative
from each IAC agency. 642/

The alleged "faults and weaknesses" cited by the FLWG
in this report apparently touched sensitive nerves, for they
drew sharp retorts from those affected. There was a highly
critical commentary by _____ of OO's P&C Staff, taking 25X1
issue with misuse of terms in the paper and the "false"
assumptions on which it was based, 643/ and also a long
critique by John Bagnall, the gist of which (in polite language)
was that members of the FLWG were not knowledgeable of the fine
points of foreign documents problems and did not appear to
know what they were talking about. 644/ Both respondents
expressed satisfaction, however, with the basic principle
included in the FLWG report, namely, the need for a service
of common concern in foreign-language document exploitation.
Thus, the exercise was not entirely a waste of time from the
FDD point of view.

Meanwhile, for the balance of the summer and early fall
of 1952 there was a general hiatus elsewhere in the intelligence

community on official action relative to a new NSCID. Maneuvering

continued, however, and a number of new versions, none differing

drastically or basically from earlier ones, were drafted. Finally,

another NSCID draft, dated 20 November, was forwarded by

James Reber to George Carey and on 4 December Reber forwarded

two more proposed versions of the NSCID, now designated "Number 16,"

to representatives of all the CIA Offices. The major difference

between the alternative drafts lay in the conception of "service

of common concern." Alternative A was based on the concept of

exclusive responsibility of CIA for handling foreign-language

materials and then handing back to other agencies -- but

presumably with some control -- portions of that total delegation.

In contrast, Alternative B provided for initial retention by the

other agencies of a portion of foreign-language materials pro-

cessing and the "remainder" to be discharged by CIA as a service

of common concern. 645/

On 16 December, the AD/IC circulated to the CIA representa-

tives an amended version of Alternative B. This transmission

was accompanied by a proposal, with terms of reference, for the

formation of an Advisory Committee on Foreign Language Publications,

and a discussion of the probable effects of the NSCID draft. In

Reber's opinion the proposed directive was unlikely to produce

a dramatic change, but would merely place on a statutory basis

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that which, in terms of procurement and exploitation of foreign-language documents, was already common practice. 646/ Reber's 16 December draft was discussed by the IAC representatives and sent in essentially the same form to the DD/I on 19 December for information and comment. 647/ It was then returned to the IAC members for further discussion at an 8 January 1953 meeting. One outcome of this meeting was the submission by G-2 of four minor changes which were tentatively agreed to by those in attendance. Reber consented to prepare a revision of the draft incorporating the Army suggestions. 648/ This was done, and on 19 January the revised NSCID 16 and terms of reference for the Advisory Committee were finally forwarded to all IAC members for concurrence or rejection. 649/

By now the new directive had apparently reached the safe harbor of agreement. By 18 February the draft NSCID 16 had been signed by the Acting DCI 650/ and on 7 March 1953, a benchmark date for FDD, the document* was finally approved by the National Security Council as set forth in IAC-D-60. 651/ The division had at last achieved legal status as the focus of foreign-language document exploitation control in the US intelligence community.

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* Cf. Appendix D.

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As the reader has observed, the progress in the formulation of NSCID 16 was a painfully slow and complicated process. Some five years had elapsed between the time the logic of having a single organ to centralize the functions of indexing and exploiting foreign documents was recognized and the time that a brief two-page definition of centralized document handling satisfactory to all concerned elements within the intelligence community had been hammered out. The impact of the new directive on day-to-day operations was in fact small and work in the division continued much as it had in the past. However, having achieved a recognized legal status, FDD was in a position to operate from a posture of authority in all matters related to the foreign documents problem. To a large extent the division's task of solidifying and coordinating its position would be achieved through the medium of the new Advisory Committee for which NSCID 16 had also made provision. A first step would be the formulation of a new working relationship with the other elements of the intelligence community.

C. The New Committees and Problems of Coordination

The putting into effect of the provisions of NSCID 16 began with the establishment of the new Advisory Committee on

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Foreign Language Publications (ACFLP).* Inasmuch as the IAC

had already approved its terms of reference under the provisions

established by NSCID 16, the Advisory Committee could begin to

function immediately.

The Advisory Committee was made up of a chairman, who

was in every case to be a CIA representative appointed by the

DD/I, and representatives from the IAC agencies appointed by

their respective heads. James Q. Reber, the AD/IC, was

selected to serve as the first chairman. 652/ The committee

was to meet once a year, in March, and its responsibilities

were to include providing advice and guidance on the procurement,

exploitation, and referencing of foreign-language publications.

Thus, in implementing these functions the work of the committee

would have a direct bearing on the operations of both OO and

OCD, with FDD executing the functions implied by the term

"exploitation" and OCD being responsible for the other two.

Meeting as it did only on an annual basis and serving

solely in an advisory capacity, the ACFLP established three

functional subcommittees to help carry out its responsibilities.

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* Implementation of NSCID 16 was provided for by CIA Regulation
dated 23 April 1953.

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These were the subcommittees on Exploitation of Foreign-Language

Publications (SEFLP), on Procurement of Foreign-Language

Publications (SPFLP), and on Referencing of Foreign-Language

Publications (SRFLP) with John Bagnall, [ ] (until   25X1

his appointment, vice James Reber, as chairman of the ACFLP in

December 1954), 653/ and George B. Brown as chairmen, respectively.

Only the first of these committees will concern us for the

purposes of this history.

Measures to implement NSCID 16 continued in the spring

of 1953. Considerable correspondence was devoted to a precise

definition of the division of responsibility between OO and OCD.

In this connection, arrangements were made for the transfer of

all FDD library functions to OCD.* 654/ Meanwhile, the sub-

committees of the Advisory Committee were activated and the

Exploitation Subcommittee, chaired by John Bagnall and attended

by representatives of all the IAC agencies, met for the first

time on 1 May 1953. The objectives of the subcommittee were

discussed and formulated and it was agreed to consider the

agenda on a country-by-country basis with a special session

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* This change-over will be more fully treated in the next chapter.

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covering S&T exploitation. With meetings held on a semi-monthly schedule the expectation was to cover all world areas every six months.

The new mode of operation was successful from the start. Consumer appraisal of FDD's exploitation program was available and applied on a scale never previously matched. IAC representatives intensively reviewed the coverage provided by FDD and other exploitation facilities (in the United States and overseas) of all foreign-language publications received and processed in the intelligence community. Lists of publications were studied, specific "gaps" in coverage were discovered and closed, and coordinated IAC requirements were developed in detail for each geographic area. As a result, there was a new apportionment of effort, overlapping exploitation was eliminated, and exploitation programs were worked out in the light of the priority needs of each agency. Various new report series were devised by FDD to meet special needs and from then on virtually all FDD reporting was done in direct answer to requirements. 655/ Briefly stated, the SEFLP was employed to develop a program that maximized the utilization of available facilities according to the highest priority needs of the community.

The success of the SEFLP does not imply that the implementation of NSCID 16 and the activities of its committees from then

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on eliminated all the problems associated with document exploita-
tion. Witness to this — to cite only one example — was the
fact that even after several months the State Department
representative on the SEFLP still felt moved to question the
authority of the DCI in the coordination function relative to
document processing. 656/ What the new directive had accomplished
was to concentrate disagreements and antagonisms, heretofore
handled in a haphazard and diffuse manner in the inter-organizational
relationships of the intelligence community, in the SEFLP
coordinating mechanism where they could be resolved more easily
and with greater dispatch. A good example of this was the issue
of FDD commentary on exploited text. When the question was again
briefly revived in 1953, it created considerably less heat than
had been the case earlier. 657/ The mild reaction to this
subject underlined the value to the community of the SEFLP.
Debate within the group, on this subject and others, was at
times sharp, but the improved opportunity to exchange informal
views on controversial topics made achievement of a group position
much easier and reduced the need to resort to formal channels.

The Inspector General's Survey of FDD at the end of 1955
declared the arrangement a success and stated that, in the main,
the subcommittee had performed its coordination functions well.

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Through its work FDD was enabled to concentrate its manpower on the most profitable types of foreign document exploitation.* 658/

D. Sequel: A Revised Charter

It was under the arrangement just described that the coordinating function relating to document exploitation was conducted by FDD during the next few years. The formulation of the new NSCID and the creation of SEFLP led predictably to an expansion of FDD operations and to various changes in the format of the division's program. This will be the subject of later chapters. Before passing on to this phase of FDD's development, let us conclude this chapter, in the interest of unity, with a brief sequel dealing with developments in the formulation of NSCIDs and DCIDs affecting FDD later on in the decade of the 1950s.

The consolidation and revision of the old NIAs referred to earlier had resulted eventually in the formulation of 17

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* In connection with the broader, and now authorized, functions of FDD, steps were taken to expand CIA Regulation [ ] [ ] which had attributed to the division no official function other than that of an "inter-Agency translation service," to include, in addition to translation, the exploitation function. 659/

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NSCIDs. Beginning about March 1957, on the recommendation of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence, the NSC reviewed the existing intelligence directives for the purpose of revising and consolidating them and substituting a more coherent set of directives for the conduct of intelligence activities. The NSC in 1958 reduced the original 17 NSCIDs to a total of seven new directives.

Of primary concern to us is the fate of NSCID 16 in the general revision. The placement of the document exploitation function in the general intelligence scheme encountered problems which created some heat among the components concerned with it. As had been the case much earlier, when the problem originally arose in 1946-47 as to where the function best belonged, the question of definition -- was document exploitation a library or a collection function -- again came to the fore.

By December 1957, Lt. Gen. L. K. Truscott, the Deputy Director/Coordination (DD/C), and Lt. Gen C. P. Cabell, the DDCI, had concluded that consolidation of the old directive into four or five new NSCIDs was the best approach. At this point no mention had yet been made as to where NSCID 16 would fit, but the overall plan was to mention responsibilities only in general terms and to leave the details for incorporation in later DCIDs. 660/

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Proposed final drafts of the new NSCIDs 1 (Basic Duties and Responsibilities), 2 (Coordination of Collection Activities), and 3 (Coordination of Intelligence Production) were distributed in mid-December. Drafts of supporting DCIDs had also been proposed, with the new DCID on Foreign-Language Publications largely a reissue of the former NSCID 16. 661/ George Carey and John Bagnall were dismayed to find that in the new drafts document exploitation had been attached to the paragraph in NSCID 1 on reference services. Carey immediately informed the Deputy Director/Intelligence (DD/I), Robert Amory, of the refusal by Dr. Omar Pancoast of the DD/C's office to shift the sentence on document exploitation to NSCID 2, where Carey felt it properly belonged. Carey explained to Amory that in his opinion the misplacement of the sentence would have an adverse effect on the morale of FDD intelligence officers who regarded themselves as intelligence collectors and not, as the wording in the NSCID 1 draft implied, merely as translators. Amory indicated that it was too late to change the drafts since they had already gone to the printers but he requested a memo from Carey proposing inclusion of the document exploitation reference in NSCID 2. 662/
continued to exert pressure in connection with the new NSCIDs and in a conversation a week later found Amory in sympathy with the OO position that document exploitation

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should be transferred from NSCID 1 to NSCID 2. At the same

time [ ] advised the DD/I that the ACFLP, established

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in 1953 by NSCID 16, should be abolished and replaced by

separate committees for exploitation and for procurement. 663/

 The matter was reviewed in detail the following day by

Carey in the memorandum requested earlier by Amory. The AD/O

again stressed the collection aspect of the FDD operation and

expressed puzzlement over the placement of Contact Division

and FBID under NSCID 2 and FDD under NSCID 1 when all three

divisions were engaged in collection activities. He again

strongly recommended placing the document exploitation function

under NSCID 2 and suggested the formulation of two DCIDs, to

cover foreign-language publication exploitation and publica-

tion procurement. 664/

 The OO protests bore results. On 21 January 1958 the

new NSCID 2, including in Paragraph 9 the desired reference

to foreign-language document exploitation, was concurred in

by the IAC, and on 28 January the DCI declared the review of

NSCIDs, with some exceptions, completed. 665/ Then, on

3 February, a special meeting of the SEFLP reviewed and

approved a proposed DCID and forwarded it to the DD/C for

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presentation to the IAC. 666/ At a meeting of the IAC on

20 May 1958 several actions were taken. DCID 2/4 "Exploitation

of Foreign Language Publications" (IAC-D-105/24, 24 April 1958)

was approved by the membership. At the same time, the old

ACFLP, chaired by [   ] was abolished (a fact noted   25X1

with satisfaction by Carey 667/) and, under DCID 2/4, the new

Committee on Exploitation of Foreign Language Publications

(CEFLP) was established in its place. Bagnall was appointed

chairman of the new committee. 668/ The abolition of the ACFLP

also meant the automatic end of the Exploitation, the Procure-

ment, and the Referencing Subcommittees of the larger

committee. The effect of these changes was to create a

sharper division between the exploitation and procurement

functions than had existed under NSCID 16 and the ACFLP and

to establish closer control of the exploitation operation

under OO. Under the earlier arrangement, OO and OCR* activi-

ties and responsibilities had tended to overlap.

Prior to the first session of the new CEFLP, Bagnall

suggested to [   ] an innovation which he hoped would   25X1

assist him in better representing CIA views on the committee.

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* OCD was renamed the "Office of Central Reference" (OCR)
on 12 August 1955.

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One of the weaknesses under the old Exploitation Subcommittee had been the fact that the Agency's wide diversity of interests in information from foreign-language sources had prevented the presentation of a unified Agency position at the subcommittee meetings and had inhibited him from speaking with a more authoritative voice. To remedy this drawback, he proposed that a CIA Panel on Exploitation of Foreign-Language Publications be established. Permission was granted and the Panel was formed. 669/ Its first meeting, attended by representatives from various CIA offices, was held on 8 July and agreement was reached on the general objectives of the group. 670/

Meanwhile, on 2 June 1958 the first meeting of the CEFLP, with John Bagnall presiding, was held. Among its first items of business was the formulation of the committee objectives. In effect these aims were identical to those pursued by the SEFLP which it had replaced. FDD's reporting program was reviewed regularly by the committee and the division received guidance in the form of broad requirements and recommended changes of emphasis. The committee also acted as a coordinating mechanism for other exploitation activities of the US Government. The CEFLP membership was also similar, consisting of representatives of the United States Intelligence Board (the former IAC),

namely, State, Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, NSA, the Joint

Staff, AEC, FBI, and CIA. Meetings were held approximately

once every month. 671/

During the next few years the CEFLP performed its function

efficiently and well. Later on, however, the committee met

less frequently. By 1962, sessions were held five times a

year for an annual review of each of FDD's five major area

programs. In all this time no problem arose requiring resolu-

tion at the USIB level. On 31 May 1962, on the basis of a

study conducted earlier in the year, the Coordination Staff

attached to the Office of the DCI recommended that the CEFLP

should be eliminated as a USIB instrument and its functions

assigned to CIA for implementation. 672/ Carey concurred

with this recommendation 673/ and Bagnall raised no objections.

It was the latter's view that broad exploitation programs

having been established, close cooperation between agencies

effected, and FDD's role as a service of common concern widely

understood, a point had been reached where regular CEFLP

meetings were no longer needed and changes in requirements

could be better handled at the desk line than in committee.

Coordination of an activity concerning FDD and a non-CIA

agency could be dealt with on a bilateral basis. In sum,

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Bagnall had no strong feelings on the question of retention or dissolution of the committee, since FDD would continue to function as before. 674/ Thus, after a brief delay for further study of the question, in September 1962, by DCI decision, the CEFLP was disestablished as a USIB instrument and its coordination function vested in CIA. From then on, the committee was reconvened on an ad hoc basis only as required to serve as a community reference point for matters affecting the exploitation or translation of foreign-language publications. 675/

This chapter has traced in detail the progress toward formulation of the charter sought for so long by FDD to establish an authoritative basis for its function as a service of common concern in the US intelligence community. By the time that NSCID 16, and subsequently NSCID 2, and the concomitant DCIDs were authorized, the pattern of operation of the division was already firmly established and the directives therefore had only a limited effect on its day-to-day work. Their importance lay mainly in the fact that they represented a legal recognition by the community that henceforth the authority to speak for the Agency in all matters relating to foreign-language document exploitation rested solely in FDD. This had a decided influence on future operational developments in this field, a factor which will be amply evident in the next and in later chapters.

CHAPTER TEN

Growth of Operations

Following the approval of its new charter in 1953 and the subsequent formation of the Exploitation Subcommittee, the Foreign Documents Division's operational development moved forward at an accelerated pace as the division adjusted to its newly acquired status as official foreign-language document center for the US intelligence community. The official status was new, but the operational procedures, for the moment at least, were still the ones put into effect and employed during the past six years. It was inevitable that, with the increasing workload, adjustments to adapt to changing circumstances would have to be made. The changes were, however, less of substance than of degree.

Since the evolution and the nature of the division's functions have been covered earlier, this chapter will give only passing emphasis to the details of daily routine operations but will concern itself rather with the new changes themselves and with the operational highlights that resulted from them in the years following approval of NSCID 16.

A. Reorganization and Reorientation

Simultaneous with the period of the formulation and authorization of its new charter, FDD achieved the highest T/O level — [   ] — that it was ever to reach in the   25X1
course of its 20-year existence and also the maximum number of persons actually employed — slightly more than [   ] early   25X1
in FY-1954 — that the division would attain. With the like- lihood of a larger workload as a result of the new charter, this development seemed most appropriate. The potential for an augmented work force authorized by the T/O created a bright prospect for maintaining the demands for service within the capacity of FDD personnel to meet them. This hope was, however, doomed from the start.

Anticipating increased demands by the intelligence community during the next fiscal year, the division had requested an additional 36 positions for FY-1954 which would bring its T/O strength [   ] slots. 676/ The attainment   25X1
of this figure seemed reasonable in view of the fact that since February 1953 the number of personnel applications received in FDD and the quality of applicants had greatly increased. This was largely due to reduced hiring in other CIA Offices as well as "reductions in force" elsewhere in the

government. As a result, 76 actions were pending and it seemed reasonable to expect that the full quota of [ ] could be reached by the end of FY-1953. The need for a complement of this size was readily evident when consideration was given to the fact that, despite an overtime program of approximately 1,200 hours per pay period, FDD was unable to keep abreast of its priority workload, and the backlog in exploitation service amounted to two to four months in some area and subject cate- gories. FDD's responsibilities had increased under NSCID 16 and were expected to grow even more. 677/ To a considerable degree this increase could be attributed to -- as John Bagnall reported -- the "astonishing" number of gaps in exploitation discovered as a result of the new Exploitation Subcommittee's coordination efforts. 678/

25X1

Regardless of the apparent need the FDD appeal for a larger work force was rejected. Worse still, on 11 August a personnel reduction, as a result of the transfer of division personnel to OCD, went into force. Despite Bagnall's appeal to retain at least the [ ] figure, 679/ the division com- plement was lowered by 13 positions to [ ] In FY-1955 the latter number was further reduced, by 40 to [ ] and it was at this plateau, with minor variations, that FDD operated for the next four and a half years. In practical effect it

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was a paper reduction only, since the number of persons

actually on duty, [   ] remained fairly constant. How-   25X1

ever, the lack of authorized headroom left no provision for

the division to accommodate to the greater demands placed

upon it. It was anticipated that urgent consumer require-

ments could only be met by an increased overtime increment

of 25 percent. 680/ The imposition of a ceiling on personnel

recruitment at a time when FDD was at its peak of success in

obtaining qualified personnel after having experienced several

years of mediocre recruiting results and in a period when its

need for new employees was greatest constituted a severe blow

to the division's planned development. Consequently, measures

were instituted to establish priorities in the required trans-

lation service, and the planned exploitation expansion had

to be curtailed.

The 1954 contraction in the FDD work force was only

the beginning of a series of personnel reductions. From

early 1959 on there was a gradual erosion in the number of

T/O positions assigned to FDD, so that by FY-1961 the figure

had been reduced [   ] During the same period the amount   25X1

of overtime allowed annually had dropped drastically from

35,000 to 1,000 hours. Compensating to some degree for these

decreases was a rise in contractual funds, but on balance

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this amount did not fully make up for the monetary cuts sustained by the division. 681/ Early in 1964 the T/O was further reduced and in mid-1965 it reached a low point of ☐ positions.

25X1

Thus the overall trend in FDD personnel strength from 1954 through mid-1965 was downward. This was followed in the next year and a half, however, by a rise, so that by the time of the merger with FBIS in early 1967 the T/O had again reached the FY-1961 level.

Variations in the size of the work force were not the only changes affecting FDD in the post-charter period. There were some minor administrative alterations and other changes of a more significant nature. One may cite as an example a change already initiated at an earlier date. This pertained to the reclassification of the FDD grade structure, which had the effect of raising the division's average grade level. A desk audit started in December 1951 by the Agency's Classification and Wage Division to bring FDD's positions into conformity with Agency designations and descriptions, had found that increased responsibilities and greater specialization by FDD employees warranted such an up-grading. The change was accomplished in two phases. The first, during 1952, dealt with the lower grades and set the minimum linguist grade at GS-9, unit chiefs at GS-11, and section

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chiefs at GS-12.* 682/ The second phase, involving the up-grading of branch chiefs and their deputies to GS-14 and GS-13 and the division chief and his deputy to GS-15 and GS-14, respectively, was approved in April 1953. 683/

Another form of up-grading was also accomplished in the course of time. During the first eight years of FDD's history the division had found it impossible to fill its S&T T/O at the salaries allowed owing to the difficulty of recruiting individuals possessing a scientific or engineering background in conjunction with an adequate knowledge of foreign languages. The lure of higher salaries in private industry in the postwar years proved a greater incentive than the lower-paying, if more secure, government positions. After a lengthy effort to solve the problem, the Civil Service Commission in FY-1955 finally provided for the payment of a salary differential for scientific personnel in government. After some delay, such increments were also allowed for qualified FDD officers, and recruitment became more sucessful. By mid-1955 the FDD S&T T/O was filled for the first time. 684/ By fall of the following year, ☐ professional personnel in the S&T Branch had become the beneficiaries of scientific pay

25X1

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* By 1963 the GS-11 grade was finally recognized as the basic journeyman position in FDD.

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adjustments. 685/ This apparent discrimination in salary rates for comparable grades created some grumbling among other professionals in the division but caused less dissension than might reasonably have been anticipated.

In addition to personnel-related matters affecting operations, the division had also to contend with structural changes within the component. One early result of the new NSCID 16, which also constituted the procurement charter for OCD, was the dissolution of FDD's Documents Control Branch (DCB) and the transfer of its procurement function and personnel to OCD, where it served to form the new Foreign Branch (FB) of the CIA Library.

As regards FDD operations, FB was to procure documents for the division. The screening function of the defunct DCB was to be retained by FDD. Conferences in anticipation of the transfer had been initiated in April 1953 soon after NSCID 16 was approved, and on 7 May the DD/I issued an order to execute the move. 686/ The mechanics of transfer were worked out between John Bagnall and OCD's _____ and 25X1 the change-over was made with a minimum of disruption in the branch's functions. Since a major consumer of the new Foreign Branch's procurement efforts would continue to be FDD, it was decided to retain the unit in Y Building rather than move it to the OCD area on the other side of Washington.

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No changes were made in the personnel of the component and
no grade cuts were required. ☐ heretofore   25X1
Chief of the Documents Control Branch, was retained as Chief
of the Foreign Branch.

Although the transfer proceeded rather smoothly a few
problems did arise. One stemmed from a misunderstanding on
OCD's part based on its assumption that 11 DCB functions were
to be transferred to the Library together with all ☐   25X1
positions assigned to the DCB. A meeting on 2 July clarified
the fact that only the 13 positions involved in the procure-
ment function were to be shifted to OCD, while the remaining
eight, which comprised the screening activity, were to be
retained by FDD. 687/ The meeting resulted in the activation
of a Screening Section, which was attached to FDD's Reports
Branch. ☐ was designated chief of the new   25X1
section. This action was officially approved on 8 August
and the section was activated three days later. 688/ In
addition to screening, the section was to coordinate FDD's
procurement and subscription needs with the new Foreign Branch.

Although the immediate problem was resolved, the way was
not yet clear for a proper FDD-OCD working relationship in
the matter of screening newly received foreign-language
documents. A new conflict arose following FB's publication

on 18 September of its first listing of such documents.
Receipt of the list by FDD established that FB was unilater-
ally disregarding its primary mission to FDD, was withholding
the publications received, and was merely providing FDD with
an accession list from which the latter was to make its
selections. This was contrary to FDD's understanding on the
proper procedure regarding new receipts. Bagnall applied
pressure and achieved a renewed understanding that FDD was
to screen in-coming material prior to its listing. This
arrangement became effective on 1 October 1953. 689/

Other than such relatively minor misunderstandings,
however, the transition proceeded without further disruption,
and the operation, particularly in light of the physical
proximity of the procurement and other user components,
continued much as it had in the past. With FDD's responsi-
bility in procurement matters transferred to the CIA Library,
one of its major objectives of the past, that of maintaining
close cooperation with other Offices and agencies in the
procurement of foreign-language publications, ceased to be
a specific requirement of FDD.

The elimination of DCB resulted in the reduction of
the FDD T/O to [ ] and of the division ceiling to [ ]

25X1

In view of the 1953 budget curtailment and limitations on exploitation personnel, one of the first objectives of the new Screening Section was to streamline and refine the receiving process for the division's raw material. In the first year of its existence this resulted in a considerable cut-back of the number of subscription orders placed by FDD.

In October 1953, in a move designed to facilitate the assumption by FDD of the "primary responsibility" under NSCID 16 for exploitation of foreign-language publications, the division undertook a second reorganization. This comprised the tentative realignment of the functions and language/area coverage previously assigned to the Near East/Africa and the Western Europe Branches. It combined, on a six-months' trial basis, the two components into a new Western World Branch. The purpose was to effect a broader, if somewhat shallower, coverage of the entire world outside the Iron Curtain and to target it on information from "Western World" sources concerning the USSR and its Satellites, including Communist China. The move was in keeping with the greater intelligence concentration at this time on Communist affairs and the lessened emphasis on non-Communist targets. In contrast to the former, more parochial, sectional organization of the two

separate branches, the new component was organized to cover broad national areas of interest and gave promise of greater efficiency in relating the division's language potential to such areas. The change affected other parts of FDD as well. Coverage of Finland was transferred to the new branch from the Eastern Europe Branch, and responsibility for handling of the Asiatic USSR minorities, formerly part of the Near East/ Africa Branch, was reassigned to the USSR Branch.

The six-months' experiment proved the tentative reorganization plan to be both practical and effective; therefore, on 12 April 1954 the DAD/O, on Bagnall's recommendation, requested that the FDD T/O be amended to eliminate the old branches permanently and to include the new Western World Branch. In addition, the occasion of the request was used to improve further the quality of FDD service. The division's experience, particularly in connection with the Western World experiment, had proved that a less rigid personnel assignment policy was required to deal with the ebb-and-flow of daily requirements and that changing emphases and priorities called for greater flexibility. Consequently, _____ further

25X1

requested that job descriptions of grades GS-11 and GS-12 be revised for all area branches so that these would no longer be tied to one specific geographical area or functional unit but would henceforth be interchangeable between area branches. 690/

On 10 July 1954 the existence of the Western World
Branch was formalized and it continued to function as such
until the FDD reorganization of 1960.   25X1
Chief of the defunct Near East/Africa Branch, was named the
first chief of the Western World Branch, with   25X1
former chief of the Western Europe Branch, as his deputy.
The personnel action request by   was partially approved.   25X1
The exception was that GS-12 section chiefs would continue to be
identified with specific areas or subjects. 691/

With consolidation of the Western World Branch and trans-
fer of the Documents Control Branch completed, the organiza-
tional structure of FDD remained relatively intact for the next
three and a half years. Then concurrent with the reorientation
of the division's function through approval in 1958 of NSCID 2,
which replaced NSCID 16, and shortly after establishment of
FDD's new field operation, the USJPRS, the organization once
again entered a period of consolidation and redefinition of its
production practices.

On 6 December 1957 George Carey, at John Bagnall's
initiative, submitted to the Chief of the Management Staff
a proposed plan for revision of the FDD organization and
requested approval of the suggested changes. The plan, as
outlined, involved no increase in personnel and only a

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minimal increase in annual cost, estimated at about $32,000.
Briefly stated, the Carey plan called for a consolidation and
reduction in the number of sections in the division. The
number of branches in FDD was to remain fixed at six, although
the Reports Branch was to be redesignated "Support Branch" and
the Scientific Branch renamed "Scientific and Technical
Branch," but the 41 sections which comprised the branches were
to be reduced to 21 (later changed to 22). In effect, the
reorganization was to be accomplished by combining related
functions and in general doubling the size of each section.
Other changes involved discontinuance of the Language Con-
sultants Service* and the adoption, as more descriptive, of
the classification title "Intelligence Officer (Foreign
Documents)" in place of the "Foreign Documents Officer" then
in current use. To reflect the increased responsibilities of
FDD branch and section chiefs, Carey recommended a one-grade
increase for these positions to GS-15 and GS-13, respectively.
This was to be accomplished by manipulating the overall
division grade structure but involved primarily a reduction
in the number of GS-12 slots. Carey supported the grade
increases by a "Justification" attached to his memorandum.

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* See Ch. Eleven.

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This document placed major emphasis on the increased re-
sponsibilities and complexities of the positions which had
expanded considerably since 1952 when the branch chief grade
level had last been raised. 694/ The Carey "Justification"
was supported by two memoranda written in late January 1958
by Bagnall. 693/

Having presented its case, FDD in company with OO pre-
pared to defend it. A careful scrutiny of the proposal by the
Management Staff and Office of Personnel (OP) was not unexpected,
and opposition to some of it was encountered before long.

[_____] of the Position Evaluation Division, while   25X1
admitting the greater sophistication and volume of the FDD
product, found little justification for the branch chief
increase, though he conceded there did appear to be suffi-
cient reason for raising the level of the section chief
slots. 694/ [_____] conclusions were upheld by the Assistant   25X1
to the Deputy Director/Intelligence (Administration) (A/DD/I
[Admin]) 695/ and, following further review by the Management
Staff and OP, the new T/O was approved on 27 May with
increases for the section chiefs but not the branch
chiefs. 696/ The FDD reorganization was put into effect on
4 June 1958. Three GS-11 positions were transferred to JPRS/NY

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and ☐ positions were upgraded to GS-13. 697/ This provided   25X1

for ☐ section chiefs occupying GS-13 slots in FDD. One of

the proposed new sections, the Current Information Section,

in the USSR Branch was not approved; the two section chief

positions in the Support Branch were not upgraded at this

time.

The 1958 reorganization enabled the division to achieve

at least part of its objective of realigning the managerial

and functional structure to provide greater effectiveness in

its service to the community, but more needed to be done if

it were to approach its ideal. With T/O reductions* and an

ever-increasing workload as persistent factors, it was neces-

sary to make the best possible use of the personnel on hand

and to manage it in the most efficient and productive manner.

With this in mind, FDD in early 1960 initiated action which

was to result in the most far-reaching reorganization under-

taken by the division since 1949. This development coincided

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* In July 1959, as an outgrowth of the DCI's "Program for
Greater Efficiency in CIA" launched in January, the DD/I
requested a reexamination of activities and functions by
his Office chiefs with a view to cutting the T/O. 698/
The effect of this study on FDD resulted in a ten-position
cut at the beginning of FY-1961. This had been preceded
by a reduction of nine T/O positions at the beginning of
1959.

with a new community-wide effort to seek information con-
tributing to a truer perspective and better analysis of
Communist activities within and outside the Orbit.* It was
at this time, too, that a move from [   ] , which the   25X1
division had occupied for the past eleven and a half years,
was pending. The new reorganization, if approved, was to
coincide with the move.

In February 1960 John Bagnall discussed his ideas for
a new reorganization with the Acting AD/O and proposed the
rather sweeping concept of consolidating the FDD branches,
then six in number, into three larger area branches plus the
Support Branch. Each of the new units would have 70 to 75
people, and with the added responsibility that this would
entail Bagnall again revived the issue of GS-15 grades for
his branch chiefs. 699/

The Bagnall proposal met with a favorable response from
both Carey and [   ] both of whom anticipated resistance as   25X1
before from the personnel people to the higher branch chief
levels, and this proved to be the case. Nonetheless, Carey
thought highly of the reorganization plan and decided to

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* The effect of this closer scrutiny of the Sino-Soviet Bloc
as the primary area of intelligence community concern on FDD
production operations will be more fully treated later in this
chapter.

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implement it even if the GS-15 positions were not granted.
He discussed the promotion matter, however, with Robert Amory,
the DD/I, in hopes of winning him over to the OO side, but
this effort was fruitless in view of the opposition by

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the A/DD/I (Admin), who recommended to Amory

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that the change to GS-15s not be allowed. 700/

Meanwhile, it was decided to proceed with the reorgan-
ization whatever the outcome of the grade change dispute. On
17 May Bagnall announced to the division the pending changes
which, he stated, were being undertaken in recognition of
the fact that the Sino-Soviet Bloc was the primary area of
intelligence community concern and therefore had first call
on FDD resources. 701/ The changes were designed to concen-
trate these resources on the main intelligence target. In
addition to the Support Branch and the field offices, which
remained unchanged, the new structure provided for these
three large area components, the USSR, Asia, and Europe/
Africa branches, which would incorporate all personnel
assigned to the former area branches. Each new branch was
at first organized functionally into six sections covering
the fields of politics, economics, science, sociology, and
military matters, but subsequently some of the functional
sections reverted to a geographic basis of operation.

SECRET

The reorganization further provided that Lawrence

Bucans, former Chief of the S&T Branch, would serve as Deputy

Chief of the new USSR Branch. Similarly, [   ]   25X1

Chief of the Western World Branch, and [   ]   25X1

Acting Chief of the Eastern Europe Branch, would move to

deputy positions in the Asia and the Europe/Africa Branches

respectively. Earlier in 1960 [   ] former head   25X1

of the Eastern Europe Branch, had succeeded the retiring

[   ] as Deputy Chief, FDD.   25X1

Final endorsement of the proposed FDD reorganization

was granted by the DD/I and DD/S on 9 June 1960. Meanwhile,

heated discussions on the issue of the higher slots for FDD

branch chiefs continued with OP's Salary and Wage Division

officers. At issue was not only the OP refusal to grant

GS-15 grades for branch chiefs but also its proposal to down-

grade the deputy branch chiefs to GS-13. This drew a sharp

blast from Carey and OP relented to the extent of leaving the

deputy chief positions untouched. However, failure to upgrade

the branch chiefs created a situation whereby two branches had

deputies at GS-14, but the deputy in the third area branch was

only a GS-13. OO's and FDD's new emphasis was on raising at

least this position one step. 702/ Amory supported the OO

proposal but hedged on the matter of upgrading the branch

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chiefs. 703/ After further delay, OP finally relented and granted FDD the desired GS-14 slot. 704/ There, for the moment, the matter rested.

The DD/I's ambivalence on upgrading the FDD branch chiefs was still in evidence when Carey revived the question six months later, but he agreed to abide by any solution worked out by OP and OO. 705/ The matter dragged on for several more months. Then finally in early 1961 another Salary and Wage Division survey resulted in the upgrading of the postions, and in May the chiefs of the three area branches were promoted to the higher grade. 706/

More than two years later cognizance was also taken of the need for changes in the Support Branch. FDD's support services were reorganized on 4 September 1962 to effect an expansion and centralization of these functions. Deviating from the pattern in the rest of the division, two deputy chiefs were appointed for Support Branch —   25X1

as Deputy for Coordination and   erstwhile   25X1

      chief, as Deputy for Operations.   25X1

The 1960 and 1962 reorganizations were significant ones, for they played an important role in the new orientation in reporting which accompanied it. It was also the last reshuffling of such magnitude in the division. With the

exception of the transfer of the Acquisitions Branch from the CIA Library to FDD in April 1965 after the latter had come under OCR subordination, the FDD structure remained essentially unchanged from then on.

The reorganization was not the only change experienced by FDD in 1960 and 1961. As mentioned earlier, it was delayed pending completion of a physical move by the division from its old quarters in ⬚ to a new location in the Matomic Building at 1717 H Street, N. W., in downtown Washington. In the early stages of planning for the new CIA Headquarters at Langley, Virginia, it was contemplated that FDD would be consolidated with the rest of the Agency in the new building, thus bringing to fulfillment the expectations of those who anticipated better and more efficient service should the division ever be brought into close proximity with its main consumers. Numerous planning sessions were conducted in which the FDD Administrative Officer, ⬚ serving as the division representative, participated. From 1955 on, however, the space allocated to FDD in the new structure was gradually but persistently reduced as building costs and the space needs of Offices with higher priorities rose.

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25X1

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Meanwhile, in October 1955 two floors in the Matomic
Building were made available to the other two OO divisions,
CD and FBID, but no provision was made for FDD. More than
four years of space planning had transpired when in January
1960 the Office of Logistics (OL) informed Bagnall that the
division would have to vacate [   ] by 1 October (con-   25X1
struction of the new D.C. Stadium on this site was then
imminent). OL proposed a temporary move to Arlington Towers
in the Rosslyn section of Arlington, Virginia, until the new
Langley building was ready for occupancy, then estimated to
be in spring 1962. 707/ To forestall a possibly worse fate, FDD
agreed on 26 February to accept the Arlington Towers space,
and the staff, led by [   ] began to plan for squeezing into   25X1
19,400 square feet personnel and equipment which up to then
had occupied 29,500 square feet of floor space in the old
quarters. 708/

By April 1960 FDD's enforced move from [   ] had   25X1
been set forward to 1 June, but the proposed shift to Arlington
Towers had in the meantime been abandoned in favor of a move
to recently acquired space in the Matomic Building. 709/
With the prospective move here, FDD for the first time
in its existence would be united with OO and its other
subordinate divisions. An OO announcement on 28 September

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to the division revealed that this move was to be permanent,
and further planning for FDD to join other Agency components
in Langley was given up. 710/ The move to 1717 H Street took
place over the weekend of 27 to 29 January 1961 and by Monday
morning, 30 January, the division was open for business in
its new quarters. Thus FDD's second major relocation was
completed; it had one more to go.

B. Overseeing FDD Operations

With FDD's charter formulated, its role in the community
firmly established, and a degree of consolidation accomplished,
it may be well, as prelude to a consideration of further opera-
tional expansion and growth, to cite briefly the division's
accomplishments by the end of 1953. In the previous few years
close to a quarter million documents were received annually for
processing in FDD — some 241,000 during 1953 — of which ap-
proximately 100,000 were Russian, Chinese, and Eastern European
sources. Requirements received for document exploitation
had grown from 194 in 1947 to 2,805 in 1953. Against these,
more than 6 million foreign-language pages were screened in
1953 to determine their intelligence potential, up from
2,800,000 in 1948, the first full year of this activity by
the organization. The screening resulted in the issuance in
1953 of reports amounting to 165,000 pages, a sizeable

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increase over the 52,000 pages issued in 1948. These

increases had been accomplished with a rise in the complement

on duty from 142 at the end of 1948 to 292 by the end of

1953, or approximately double the work force. By the end of

1953 the division was adequately staffed to conduct its

exploitation and translation functions in 72 languages. 711/

By the end of 1954 the five area branches of FDD were pro-

ducing some 40 scheduled reports. This figure was in a

permanent state of flux as, under constant scrutiny in the

effort to produce better and more efficient service, old

titles were dropped and new ones added. In addition,

exploitation and translation of classified sources in answer

to specific requirements continued in increasing volume, and

"Reference Aids" of various kinds, a by-product of routine

FDD operations, were produced at a growing rate. 712/

Of great assistance to the accomplishment of the

division's task was the work performed by the Subcommittee

on Exploitation of Foreign Language Publications, established

under NSCID 16, and later on, in the early 1960s, by the

Committee on Exploitation of Foreign-Language Publications

under NSCID 2, both chaired by John Bagnall. These groups

gave much-needed guidance to FDD in keeping its work on

target and, in the absence of close proximity of the division

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to its consumers, served as an important supplement to the limited liaison conducted under the difficult circumstances created by distance. The SEFLP met on a regular basis approximately once every two weeks throughout the year and served as a forum for the IAC representatives to discuss mutual problems and to establish the guide lines which served FDD so well in maintaining a proper perspective.

In addition to its periodic surveys, the SEFLP also provided a mechanism for dealing with specific problems as these arose. In 1955, for example, a review of the trans-literation practices by IAC agencies was started, an effort which resulted in the issuance of a CIA handbook on the sub-ject. In the same year, in response to a growing need for standardization of Chinese Communist terminology, the sub-committee established a working group to examine this prob-lem. 713/ Among the SEFLP's other accomplishments was the recommendation in 1956 to establish the new USJPRS in order to facilitate document coverage in depth and breadth. 714/ In like manner, the CEFLP of USIB, besides the routine review of the FDD program, issued reports in response to special needs, for example, one on the translation of Soviet scientific and technical material and another on an emergency plan for wartime foreign-language document exploitation. 715/

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The "watch dog" nature of the SEFLP and CEFLP function
in respect to FDD activities was supplemented by a number of
surveys of division operations, usually as a part of the
Agency but sometimes as an individual organization, much as
had occurred during the pre-charter period in the case of the
1950 Dulles Report and the 1951 Jackson Survey. Among those
conducted after 1953 was the Clark Survey of 1954. This was
carried out by a task force on intelligence activities
appointed by former President Herbert Hoover, at that time
chairman of the Committee on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government. Headed by Lt. Gen. Mark Clark,
the task force was asked to make recommendations as to the
structure and administration of CIA and other kindred foreign
intelligence activities. It conducted its survey during
the latter half of 1954 and early 1955 and in May completed
an exhaustive investigation of high-level US intelligence
operations around the world. From the FDD standpoint the
impact of the survey was minimal and quite disappointing.
The point of contact was a quick and somewhat desultory visit
on 12 November 1954 by Col. Eugene R. Miller and Mr. John R.
Magruder of the Clark Committee. They were briefed by John
Bagnall and by each of the branch chiefs, but in their

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questioning they dwelt mainly on personnel figures and pro-
duction costs and showed little interest in examining the
value of FDD production to the intelligence community. 716/

Much more painstaking and reliable was a survey of the
division conducted by the Inspector General (IG) of the
Agency during September 1955. Its aim was five-fold, namely,
to determine: the soundness of FDD's charter, NSCID 16; the
effectiveness of the ACFLP and the SEFLP in assisting the
DCI in his coordination function; the value of FDD's program
and the quality of its publications; the importance of FDD's
special projects and activities; and FDD's responsiveness to
requirements. 717/ This exercise was favorably received by
FDD, OO, and the Office of the DD/I, 718/ and the feeling
was apparently mutual, for FDD was commended on its perfor-
mance, with the opinion expressed that the division was
performing its mission to the general satisfaction of its
users. In his 76-page report, issued on 19 November 1955,
the IG did, however, make ten recommendations designed to
eliminate the causes for criticisms contained in the body of
the report. Among the latter was the impression that source
procurement in the community was not of the best; it was
suggested that this could only be improved by CIA taking over
the publications procurement program from State. The survey

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team felt that there was much room for improvement in FDD in
the selection and treatment of materials available. They
found a tendency to publish too much and to abstract infor-
mation rather than to follow the more difficult method of
translating verbatim and of extracting information. It was
felt that the current program was too inflexible, coverage
too general, and reportorial accuracy at times suspect. FDD
was also found to have drifted into activity of library concern,
such as the publication of reference aids. It was recommended
this work be discontinued and transferred to OCR. The overlapping
and confusion existing between FDD and OSI in the publication
of certain S&T issuances was also criticized, and a discreet
investigation of TWLS activities was recommended. Finally,
FDD's Linguistic Service and the proof-reading function were
mentioned as deserving of expansion and more emphasis. 719/

Bagnall concurred with the majority of the recommenda-
tions included in the IG Survey but questioned some, such as
the recommendation that branch and deputy branch chiefs
critically read all reports produced by their areas. He
pointed out that this requirement for obvious reasons was
impractical. 720/ Nonetheless, during the course of the
next year steps were initiated to take action on each recom-
mendation contained in the Survey. These included such

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actions as: various career planning projects; the referral of security problems relating to Project UT to the Office of Security (OS); the discontinuance on 28 November 1955 of the FDD Reference Aid series and transfer of this function to OCR; the issuance of two style manuals in January 1956 to improve the quality of FDD reports; a request on 15 February 1956 for changes in grades of editorial assistants (proof-readers) to improve report quality (the request was turned down); the opening of a Linguistic Service office ⬚ 25X1

⬚ on 7 May 1956. 721/ 25X1

C. Procurement Problems

Of continuing interest in FDD was the matter of source procurement upon which the organization's operations depended. After the transfer of the division's previous primary concern in foreign-language document procurement to the CIA Library in 1953, FDD participation in this important activity was essentially reduced to dependence on OCD's Foreign Branch. Nonetheless, because its operations were so closely allied with procurement, the division retained a keen interest in it and cooperated closely with FB in matters related to it. To a minor extent FDD participated directly: it furnished the OO representative on the Agency Document Procurement Committee,

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_____ initially and _____ after late   25X1

1955; it fulfilled special assignments, such as the partici-
pation of Chief, FDD, on an OCR task force established in
December 1957 to examine the effectiveness of the US publica-
tions procurement system; and its officers also served in a
number of document surveys, both in the United States and
abroad.

Sources obtained from all parts of the world constituted
the life blood of the organization and without a steady flow
of these materials the *raison d'etre* of the division would no
longer have existed. It was therefore not surprising that the
organization maintained an anxious eye on the rise and fall
in source material receipts and was particularly sensitive to
any diminution of the flow.

The importance of the sources to FDD and to the intel-
ligence community in general notwithstanding, the cost of
the foreign-language publications processed by FDD constituted
a relatively small segment of the division's budget. Only
$25,000 was expended for foreign newspapers, periodicals, and
books in FY-1954, 722/ and this annual level was maintained
through FY-1958. The budget for document procurement was
revised upward to approximately $35,000 in FY-1959, following
the relaxation of restrictions on previously denied Soviet

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publications (still the major target). This level was maintained through FY-1961. 723/

Soviet-imposed procurement restrictions on publications, a carryover from the post-World War II period, still faced the division in the immediate post-charter period. This factor affected several areas of the world, but was especially irksome in connection with the Soviet Bloc. The restrictions were often a form of harrassment or a type of retaliation for alleged US actions. Resort to numerous and varied overt means of procurement, including the conventional ones, failed to fill many gaps in subscriptions to foreign-language source material which had existed for several years. Certain technical journals restricted by the Soviet Union remained unavailable. Moreover, the Soviets in 1953 limited the export of provincial newspapers in more than one copy; this created problems which were resolved only after referral to SEFLP consideration. In most instances, the solution was to give FDD, as a common-concern facility, first priority in use of the single copy.* Some restriction on publications from other Communist countries was also in evidence. In the

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* The fact that in 1955 even single-copy subscriptions of 15-25 titles listed in the Soviet subscription catalogue were denied illustrates the severity of the Soviet policy of source denial. 724/

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Near East the problem was compounded by the lack of a PPO

which affected procurement and timely delivery from that

area. The decline in receipts was also felt in the Far East,

particularly in Indonesia, from which, in early 1954, only

18 of 84 titles subscribed to were received. 725/

A recurrent problem lasting well into the 1950s — and

closely associated with procurement — was that related to the

receipt of materials on a timely basis. The lack of control

by the division over the source material and its procurement

sharply affected FDD operations and continued to sour its

relations with consumers. Outdated procedures in shipment of

sources from overseas, related more to library functions than

intelligence collection, delayed the receipt of newspapers

and journals to such an extent that the division's "current"

coverage was often considerably less than that. The time

required for exploitation, added to the long delays in

delivery, badly compromised FDD's ability to serve the cur-

rent needs of the community.

The nadir in FDD's procurement problems appeared, how-

ever, to have been reached during the period 1953-1954. From

then on the efforts of the division, working in cooperation

with OCD and other procurement organizations, began to pay

off. This, in conjunction with a general relaxation in

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the intelligence target areas after the Korean War, resulted
in both a quantitative and qualitative improvement in services
rendered by FDD to the community. By 1956 there was a
decided lessening of restrictions against the export of
Soviet publications and thus an increased potential for intel-
ligence exploitation. Moreover, the new material that
became available included information on such prime subjects
as nuclear energy and guided missile research and presented
hard figures on economic matters rather than the former
nebulous reporting in percentages. 726/ From a quantitative
standpoint the situation had improved to such a degree that,
whereas in 1953-1954 CIA had been able to acquire only 75
Soviet technical and scientific periodicals, by early 1958
approximately 325 scientific and another 75 technical peri-
odicals had become available from the Soviet Union. 727/
Overall, the opening up by the USSR of its subscription lists
for export resulted in the receipt by FDD in FY-1956 of 490
Soviet titles compared with 317 during FY-1955, including
some titles which were not included in the "available"
listings. 728/ In 1960, although the Soviet Union
expressed grave concern regarding revelation of national
secrets in its press and referred pointedly to the attention
which Russian publications received in the US intelligence

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community, the flow of source materials continued unabated and the quality of content remained high.

Despite the difficulty of procuring Chinese Communist publications from mainland China due to the complete absence of US diplomatic representatives in that country and the rigid restrictions placed on the export of most Chinese printed materials, there was a significant increase in the quantity of material received from the Far East, most of it available through two channels: purchase through smugglers at Hong Kong -- quite expensive -- and procurement through the good offices of friendly "third-country" powers. The number of Chinese Communist titles rose from 148 in FY-1955 to 273 in FY-1956. This trend continued through FY-1957, and by mid-1957 some 418 periodicals had become available from that country. 729/ This was improvement, but, only in comparative terms. Many titles remained unavailable and the nonreceipt of Chinese Communist documents continued to be one of the more aggravating problems facing the division.

During the period 1955-1956 decreases in subscriptions in Africa and Western Europe were made possible owing not only to lesser emphasis on these regions but also to a greater selectivity made possible through FDD officers' growing knowledge of the source field. 730/

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A decided improvement in the timeliness of receipt of sources became evident as measures instituted by the procurement components began to bear fruit. The shipment of source material via surface mail was, with a few exceptions, gradually phased out and increasing reliance was placed on air shipments. By 1956 all Soviet newspapers were being received by air, and selected titles from the Far East and some from Germany were received via the Military Air Transport Service. With CIA Library cooperation there was a substantial increase in the number of important publications from abroad sent by air pouch and a consequent increase in timely receipt and exploitation. For example, an experimental air pouch shipment of Soviet publications from Moscow resulted in delivery of this material to FDD three to five days after issuance, compared with two weeks via the former method of rail shipment to Helsinki for forwarding. 731/ The success of the experiment led to the adoption of this method as standard procedure. By mid-1957 approximately 50 percent of FDD's total of 2,394 subscriptions were received by air. 732/

In the decade of the 1950s, there was a perceptible shift in terms of difficulty of receipt of Soviet and Chinese Communist sources. As noted above, after 1954 the restrictions of Soviet foreign-language documents were

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gradually eased, but about that time the embargo on Chinese Communist publications was tightened. In July 1958 FDD's receipt of Chinese Communist newspapers from Hong Kong suddenly declined and by October the drop had reached 50 percent. There was in the next few months only partial compensation through procurement at other locations, 733/ and certain publications continued to be received irregularly if at all. A number of these were considered to be of critical importance to the exploitation program on the Far East in that the information which they provided was pertinent to priority intelligence requirements and not available from other sources. 734/ The dearth of source material also affected other Far Eastern areas. The receipt of North Vietnamese sources was as poor as that of Chinese sources, and FDD was publishing no military information on Laos, since the source materials on hand contained no information not already available from other collection operations, chiefly FBIS. 735/

The general picture regarding Far Eastern receipts had not improved by the end of 1959 and the threat of a total ban on export of Chinese Communist publications appeared to be a reality. No newspapers, with the exception of Peking's *Jen-min Jih-Pao*, the major Chinese newspaper, were received

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after October and the receipt of Chinese newspapers and journals from non-Chinese sources was severely curtailed with attendant bad effect on FDD reporting. Even black market sources appeared to have dried up. 736/ The reason for the export embargo at this time is obscure, though one view attributed it to a paper shortage, coupled with embarrassingly poor quality paper. 737/ A more plausible and more commonly accepted explanation is that it was due to official chagrin and embarrassment over the failure of widely publicized economic plans that fell short when the "Great Leap Forward" collapsed.

The restrictive controls on the export of Chinese Communist publications continued through 1960 and extraordinary procurement measures were necessary to obtain titles formerly available. Chinese Communist journals acquired in November 1960 amounted to 44, only 10 percent of the 438 received the year before. 738/ The following month FDD reported to George Carey that it was still receiving 44 newspapers but only six periodicals providing economic and scientific information on China. The Far East Branch of FDD was able to maintain a full level of operations by thoroughly exploiting these sources, but JPRS Far Eastern linguists suffered from lack of work. 739/ The procurement

problem continued into 1961. The only source of Chinese

Communist publications at that time were receipts from

"third" countries. In view of the bleak prospects for

improvement, discussions were initiated with the Far East

Division (FE) of the DD/P to secure the desired materials

[blank]. 740/ Through intensive effort a   25X1

small flow of Chinese Communist sources to FDD and the rest

of the intelligence community was maintained, but it contin-

ued to be a mere trickle in comparison with receipts at an

earlier period.

With the heating up of hostilities in Southeast Asia

in the mid-1960s and the intensification of US involvement

there, receipt of North Vietnamese materials was increasingly

stressed. In mid-1964 there were three principal sources

of these publications, namely: subscriptions placed by the

CIA Library through the publications procurement program;

certain subscriptions received directly by JPRS; and, finally,

some 19 newspapers and periodicals received by the FBIS

Saigon Bureau [blank] Some of the latter   25X1

were first partially exploited by the bureau and then forwarded

to FDD. The problem of complete and regular receipt by FDD

of all North Vietnamese sources available in Saigon was com-

plicated by the restrictions on the amount which procurement

sources could move over the border from North Vietnam. The demand for these documents, sometimes received in only a few copies, was such that there was competition in Saigon for possession of them. 741/

Before leaving the subject of post-charter source receipts by FDD, at least brief mention should be made of a rather out-of-the-ordinary procurement project involving the division during the period of Senator McCarthy's influence in the early 1950s. Directly related to the Sino-Soviet source curtailment problem treated above, the aim of this venture, which was set up by OO and approved by the DCI in August 1954, was to enable the US Postmaster General, in conjunction with the Bureau of Customs, to establish translation units, initially in New York and later in other US ports of entry, for the purpose of screening, sorting, and segregating propaganda and other foreign-language materials received from Soviet Bloc countries. It was expected that a flow of foreign material of intelligence value would thus be made available to CIA. The cost of the project was budgeted at $45,000 annually. FDD was the originating division and [ ] was designated project case officer. Unwitting translators were hired from standard civil service lists for the work and FDD's and CIA's only involvement in it was the once-a-month contact

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From the FDD standpoint the project proved virtually without value, and on 1 February 1955 [   ] recommended its abandonment. He disclosed that nearly 40 percent of the material screened was in English and much of the balance con-sisted of well-known Russian-language literary works. So far as the "non-mailable" publications, as defined by the McCarren Act, were concerned, these were readily available through orthodox procurement channels.

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In May 1955, Carey informed the DCI concerning FDD's opinion of the project. At Mr. Dulles' request, the FDD recommendation was checked out with Richard Helms, the DD/P. Despite the wide press publicity given in the spring of 1955 to Congressional action at that time on Bloc "propaganda" material received in the United States as well as to the [   ] Helms felt the operation should be continued because of its value to his organization.

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The decision was therefore made in June to continue the project, but responsibility for it was transferred from OO to OCD, and all FDD contact with it ceased. 744/

D. A New Reporting Policy

As regards the production phase of FDD operations, no sudden or drastic changes ensued following approval of NSCID 16. The division's mission and the daily routine remained for the time being what they had been prior to March 1953. As has been mentioned, FDD operational development was an empirical process based on trial and error, and by 1953 the pattern was well set. Promulgation of NSCID 16 did not change it; it merely made it official, and the tasks of exploitation, translation, and other activity continued as before. The new charter gave the division authority to develop new methods and policies, but, more than the charter, practical considerations governed operational innovation. This section of the chapter will deal with some of this.

By 1953 FDD was engaged in a large variety of activities including foreign press and journal exploitation, some residual captured document processing, translation of classified and -- through its contractual project -- unclassified materials, translation coordination in the community through

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the CTS/DEX facility, and language training. In addition,
it also collected biographic and graphics information in
support of OCD, engaged in press propaganda analysis, rendered
interrogation and interpretation support, served in a lin-
guistic consultation capacity, and performed a number of
other related activities. The bulk of the division activity
consisted, however, of exploitation and classified translation,
which in late 1953 amounted, respectively, to 47 and 26 per-
cent of the component's total effort. 745/

In the course of time after 1953 the operations of the
division underwent many changes and innovations, each designed
for better service to the consumer. Some of these changes
involved the methodology employed in producing the raw infor-
mation, preparing it in a manner desired by the consumers
but yet consistent with the limitations imposed by "common
service," and furnishing it as expeditiously as possible to
the user.

Early in 1954 members of the Exploitation Subcommittee,
having reviewed the first part of the FDD reporting program,
that is, the USSR and Chinese non-scientific areas, recom-
mended a change in the division's reporting method. 746/
Heretofore this had consisted of the sporadic reportage in
depth on given subjects and the issuance of collations of

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this material more or less at the whim of the FDD collector
or his supervisor. The method was effective so far as it
went in that it produced all available data on a narrow sub-
ject appearing in the exploited press. The researcher issued
this material on a self-imposed schedule, generally on a
monthly basis, but the timing was not fixed. Therefore, from
the standpoint of the user the result was haphazard and
inefficient. Two practical drawbacks to this system were,
on the one hand, its potential for creating bottle-necks in
the publication process since there was no regular schedule
for receipts of reports by the printer, and, on the other
hand, the fact that it gave the recipient no assurance of
regular receipt of materials. Based on the SEFLP recommen-
dation, FDD therefore decided to initiate a program empha-
sizing scheduled reporting in breadth, as opposed to sporadic
studies in depth. By mid-1954, under SEFLP guidance, FDD
had formulated 19 reports for periodic (weekly to semi-annual)
issuance. The reports covered the Soviet and Orbit S&T, the
Chinese Communist, and part of the USSR programs.

By the end of 1955 the reporting program of FDD had
been formalized to include seven categories of scheduled
reports. These were:

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FDD Summary -- A collation of extracted materials pertaining to a common theme or related subjects. This was the "workhorse" report of the division and comprised the bulk of its exploitiation activity.

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FDD Translation Series -- Consisted of classified material, done mostly for other CIA components.

FDD Reference Aid -- Covered a wide variety of subjects of a lexicographic or special bibliographic nature.

FDD Note -- Brief item on a timely subject or new information of special interest or value to OCI or the IAC agencies.

In addition to the scheduled reports there were unpublished reports, designated U-Reports, prepared in response to specific requirements. These were initially prepared in one copy for the requester but were often of sufficient general interest to warrant dissemination, on request, throughout the community.

During the first half of 1955 the Exploitation Subcommittee conducted the first of its periodic six-months' reviews and by mid-year, as a result of this exercise, ten of the original series of 40 reports were either cancelled or combined and 12 new reports had been initiated in answer

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to requirements. These changes were effected mainly in the USSR, Far East, and Western World areas. The pattern of periodic review of the program and alteration as required soon became well established. At the end of FY-1956, for example, nine reports had been dropped and eight added, resulting in a total of 39 reports, the most notable change being the cancellation of four S&T publications and inauguration on 23 March of one comprehensive semi-monthly summary, the *Scientific Information Report* (SIR), a report which came to be highly regarded by the intelligence community. For FY-1957 the respective figures were 5 dropped, 11 added, and 45 total. In subsequent years there was a trend toward a gradual reduction (or consolidation) in the number of FDD reports — 38 in November 1958, 36 a year later, and 34 in early 1962 — while the number of JPRS reports, after the organization's establishment in 1957, rose from 53 in August 1958 to 59 a year later.

The FDD scheduled reports produced mainly FDD Summaries or FDD Reference Aids, though a few, including two press indexes, were issued in the division's [   ] The distribution list for the summaries and reference aids averaged approximately 130 consumers, that for FDD information reports [   ] about 60. 747/

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From an operational standpoint the new scheduled production was an apparent success from the start. In Calendar Years 1952 and 1953, for example, some 37,500 and 39,500 pages, respectively, of division production had been published and disseminated. During FY-1955 this figure rose sharply to approximately 84,000 pages 748/ and in FY-1956 to 97,000 pages. 749/ The nature of the 40-odd FDD reports in 1954 varied individually, of course, but in general the title and content depended upon the area covered. For example, non-scientific reports on the USSR dealt with individual fields such as consumer goods, education, or agriculture, while for other countries the reports had a broader scope, for example, the *Military Information Report on China* or the *Monthly Information Report on Africa.* The program also included one division-wide substantive report, namely, the *Selected Briefs from the International Press* initiated on 28 May 1954 to deal with Communist affairs, conferences, smuggling, sabotage, and a variety of related subjects. This report, a forerunner of the international Communism and insurgency reports of the later 1950s and the 1960s, was discontinued in February 1956.

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The first list of scheduled reports included five reference aids consisting of press and periodical indexes and annotated bibliographies. Other reference aids produced by FDD as a result of the increased emphasis on this phase of exploitation were several glossaries of place names, foreign words and phrases, technical terms, and abbreviations. Among the more important reference aids prepared and disseminated by FDD was the *Foreign Publications Exploitation Review*, issued for the first time in April 1955. Like the CTS, it also served the community as a coordination device. Its purpose was to acquaint the IAC members with the facilities and products derived from the exploitation of foreign-language publications issued by the 83 countries listed. In all, 36 reference aids were published during FY-1955; only three had been issued previously. 750/

The production of reference aids by FDD was of brief duration. In the 1955 IG survey of the division the issue of responsibility for this activity was examined and recommendation made, despite the fact that such reports were essentially by-products of FDD exploitation, that this function was rightfully a library function and should therefore be performed as a common service by OCR. Consequently, on 1 June 1956 the DD/I ordered FDD to discontinue this production

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and assign its manpower exclusively to exploitation and translation. 751/ The DD/I order was somewhat tardy, however, in that the division, in compliance with the IG study, had already ceased publication of reference aids in mid-December 1955. 752/

The scheduled reporting method adopted by FDD in 1953-1954 became standard procedure for the division and, since it introduced a greater degree of orderliness and reliability into FDD coverage of the sources, was for the most part gratefully accepted by the consumers. Initially, the SEFLP found that there were still strong demands for information published in bibliographic form, which would have amounted to a retrogression. ORR, for example, in citing its position on FDD operations, in October 1953, proposed a revival of annotated accession lists such as the division had produced up to 1949, 753/ but this request came to nothing beyond the preparation by FDD of a few such lists in its Reference Aid series involving mainly Chinese publications. Even this was discontinued in 1954 when the function was taken over by FB/CIA Library.

The SEFLP review of FDD programs under the new scheduling resulted in numerous changes. One significant change was the discontinuance of one of the division's

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earliest publications, the *Periodical Abstracts* issued by

the S&T Branch since 1947.* The decision to cease publication

of this report derived from an Air Force complaint in March

1954 on its lack of timeliness. The FDD extraction procedure

also failed to meet the requirements of the Air Force and the

latter therefore proposed that the report be discontinued and

that the manpower thereby released cooperate with the armed

services in a program of abstracting S&T periodicals. 754/

John Bagnall did not object to the Air Force proposal, but an

earlier experience in 1950, when the report had been discon-

tinued at OSI insistence and then revived when other IAC

agencies complained, made him disinclined to move precipi-

tously again, and the other agencies were therefore fore-

warned before any move was made. 755/ No objections were

received and on 1 June 1954, with SEFLP agreement, the report

was discontinued. In its stead a system of FDD cooperation

with the armed services, especially the Army and the Air Force,

was introduced and the scientific abstracts were thenceforth

produced from 54 (later 55) selected S&T periodicals by FDD,

the Air Information Division, and the Air Technical Intelli-

gence Center and disseminated on 5x8 cards. 756/ This

cooperative arrangement lasted until 5 March 1956 when,

following a report by the Air Force of receipt of an

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* See p. 60.

increasing volume of S&T periodicals and an appeal for help
from other IAC members, 757/ a SEFLP survey disclosed that
the abstracting project had evolved to the point where it
served Air Force interests exclusively. FDD participation in
the program was therefore discontinued and the job was taken
over completely by the Air Force. FDD manpower released by
this change was rechanneled into the production of scheduled
scientific reporting to meet the broader S&T needs of the
intelligence community.

With its concept of serving the intelligence community
on a broader scale through means of the new scheduled report-
ing as opposed to the specific, piece-meal methods employed
heretofore, the division was faced with the necessity of
educating its customers to convince them that their parochial
needs sometimes had to be limited or even denied in order to
provide maximum service to the community. The educative
process was a continuing one and it led to good results,
especially with the aid of SEFLP. A better understanding of
each other's problems and needs was enhanced under the
subcommittee, but, human nature being what it is, the habit
of looking out for one's own best interests was still evident.
For example, in the course of a SELFP review of the FDD
exploitation program in May 1955, despite knowledge of the

IAC emphasis on the Soviet Bloc and Chinese Communist areas as priority intelligence targets at this time and despite a reduced FDD T/O, the components of the community responsible for non-Bloc areas had refused to limit their requirements. Fortunately, an appeal by Bagnall resulted in a reassessment and ammended program. 758/

Sometimes instruction on the primacy of community needs had to be given at a lower level. At issue in August 1959 was a contentious memorandum from the chief of an ORR branch which sharply criticized FDD service and offered unsolicited suggestions on how to improve it. 759/ John Bagnall replied, pointing out the difficulties -- due to time, personnel, and budgetary limitations -- of servicing the needs of individual components at the expense of the division's common-service mission. 760/

Similar ORR complaints a year later led George Carey to convey the same message at a higher level. 761/

E. New Procedures and Problems in Operations

Meanwhile, concurrent with the development of the scheduled reporting system, a concerted effort was made in the division to improve and streamline operations in order to better serve the consumer and to get the most out of FDD's limited manpower. In 1953, for example, the use of recording

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tapes was introduced on a limited scale to speed up the translation procedure, and employment of this means was gradually adopted by a large percentage of FDD officers with positive results. To carry this effort further, the division conducted an experiment in 1960 whereby all classified translations were recorded on dictaphone belts and sent directly to consumers without transcription. Its purpose was to eliminate the time-consuming intermediate processing. The success of this effort was, however, indifferent. ORR strongly opposed FDD's use of the dictaphone belts in view of the fact that they became unusable after several play-backs and therefore saved no time for the ORR analysts. The use of the belts was eventually phased out.

The use of mechanical means to improve production was also applied elsewhere. In April 1962, with approval of Printing Services Division (PSD), FDD acquired a mimeograph printer and associated equipment for use in publishing selected reports requiring rapid dissemination with only limited distribution. By virtue of this reproduction method, two FDD scheduled reports were issued the following month within 24 hours of report completion. The value of this type of rapid dissemination was well illustrated by FDD's Latin American, and particularly Cuban, reporting in

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October 1962 at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. By September 1963 the use of this procedure had been expanded and the number of reports series so issued had increased to 15. Another device designed to speed up dissemination that was adopted in 1963 was the transcription of reports directly from dictation onto stencils.

Attempts to broaden the language base of the division were also pursued, so that FDD eventually reached a point where few of the world's exotic, not to mention well-known, languages and dialects were not within its competence. An example of this effort was the contact made in 1955 with a Tibetan-English translator which provided potential in an area heretofore not covered.

In early 1956, in compliance with the 1955 IG Survey and to improve production by encouraging clarity and concise-ness in its products, FDD adopted a plan to encourage a more journalistic style of reporting in certain FDD products. The instances cited do not exhaust the attempts — some successful, other less so — by the division to improve its services, but they serve as examples of what was done.

In spite of the continuous streamlining of operations, the increased workload placed on FDD made it apparent that the division could not provide the services for which it was

responsible without augmentation of its authorized T/O. A
1955 appeal for added personnel 762/ led to no immediate
solution. The T/O remained fixed and the ceiling was even
reduced by five in FY-1956.

Serious as they were, personnel problems in the post-
charter period were not the only ones encountered by FDD.
These varied in severity and some were recurrent while others
occurred but once. Many of them were brought up in the course
of discussions by the SEFLP and were resolved within this
small circle. Others required solution by FDD itself or by
other CIA or IAC components. A few instances involved keeping
up the staff when FDD was on occasion the victim of "raiding"
excursions by various CIA Offices. In April 1955, for ex-
ample, DD/P and OCI made simultaneous requests for Burmese-
language specialists and offered higher salaries than those
paid by the division. The result was the release of its
linguists by FDD, and for the next few months the division was
left without adequate language coverage in Burmese. 763/

Other problems pertained to various aspects of FDD
operations and production. The division was, for example,
accused of slow fulfillment of requirements, though evidence
to support this contention was not always valid. Oftentimes
special circumstances were not recognized, for example:

short deadlines (a 320-page book in two weeks); rare-language work requiring longer to complete; or the need to procure documents from abroad. 764/

On the other hand, extraordinary effort by the division did not always receive the notice it deserved. For example, in May 1955 the division translated on an urgent basis 100 abstracts submitted by Russian delegates, totaling 209 pages, at AEC request for an International Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. This work was accomplished in nine-and-a-half hours. 765/ Another example was translation by FDD of a special Russian periodical containing 283 pages of original material on space research presented by the Russian delegation during the First International Conference on Rockets and Artificial Earth Satellites held in Washington in October 1957. The document was translated in 72 hours, printed in 200 copies by the division, and distributed to interested conference participants in time for them to read it and discuss the contents with the Russians during the conference.* 766/ Prodigious efforts of this nature were not uncommon.

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* It was on 4 October 1957, during this conference, that Sputnik I was put in orbit by the USSR.

Other problems pertained to such matters as the
compilation-versus-collation argument which came up fre-
quently in SEFLP meetings, the recurrent question of FDD
commentary in text, the controversy of FDD's coverage of the
central-versus-provincial press and on basic-versus-current
information, the argument of proper manpower allocation to
priority intelligence targets, the long-drawn-out question
of one-side-of-the-page publication, and the not-infrequent
accusations (sometimes, but not always, justified) of mis-
translations in FDD reports. These are only a few examples.
In the long run the division learned to take them in stride,
making adjustments where necessary or justifying its prac-
tices as required. The disappointment over complaints was
tempered by occasional commendations and statements by con-
sumers of work well done by individuals in FDD or by the
division as a whole.

FDD also had complaints against its consumers. To
mention a specific case, the division demonstrated extreme
sensitivity to the penchant of some of the consumer Offices
to ignore FDD contributions to the intelligence effort. In
1954, for example, an ORR report listed only one contributive
FDD OO-W although many of the Russian-language publications
cited in the bibliography were regularly exploited by FDD. 767/

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In 1956 Bagnall called attention to an OSI study in which 70 of 123 references used were translated or exploited by the division but no credit was given. 768/ In each case the matter was taken up with the offending Office with in-conclusive results. The problem kept recurring, particularly between ORR and FDD.

To assure better relations between FDD and consumer Offices a vigorous program of liaison was pursued in the years immediately following NSCID 16. This was not only a desirable trend but also an imperative one in that detailed clarification of SEFLP generalizations was necessary to make the new scheduled reporting program work. Only through this liaison activity on the part of FDD was it feasible in the spring of 1954 to launch the first issues of the sched-uled reports with some hope of meeting the demands of the users.

The liaison upswing became more evident as time passed and the review of the division program progressed. FDD officers met their counterparts in most Offices of the Agency; from 1956 on, this program included the Clandestine Services, and numerous groups from this part of the Agency were briefed on FDD's operations and capabilities. In turn, FDD people, individually and in groups, were briefed on the

problems of their consumers. Continuing direct contact was
also established with other IAC organizations. These contacts
were encouraged from both sides, though it appears that most
of the impetus for the interchange of ideas and experiences
came from the FDD side. Whether or not this was the case is
unimportant. What counted was that such liaison took place
and that it paid off in most areas by more specific and
meaningful requests on the part of consumers and improved
and pertinent reporting on the division's part.

The methods of contact varied. Personal liaison on a
desk-to-desk level was common, but conferences and group
briefings were also effectively used. A device for publi-
cizing FDD production was the division's participation in
OTR's monthly Intelligence Products Exhibit, the so-called
"County Fair," which gave maximum "public" exposure in CIA
to all types of FDD reports. The division representative
for this purpose was _____ who kept the exhibit   25X1
updated and acted the role of FDD's "public relations" man.

In the matter of liaison, sporadic efforts were also
made in the late 1950s to create closer working relationships
with FBID, the division's partner in overt information
collection. Despite the inherent differences which resulted
in some inter-divisional rivalry and competition, the

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complementary nature of radio and press sources was self-evident, as was the necessity for cooperative action. This fact was officially recognized at the late date of 1958 when the consolidation of earlier NSCIDs placed both functions under NSCID 2.

The gradual progress in FDD-FBID contacts was evidenced by the coordinated press scrutiny operations established in Vienna, Frankfurt, and Saigon. Also indicative of cooperation was the continuous exchanging of needed source publications, furnishing of exploitation products, conducting of desk-level liaison, and a limited exchange of personnel on TDY. The cooperation/coordination was effective and duplication between FBID and FDD products was kept to a minimum. 769/ In this relationship the rule of FDD's primary role in press exploitation was always closely adhered to by FBID, at least in word if not in spirit, and FBID analysts and editors were reminded from time to time to consult with FDD counterparts in matters relating to press items.

A survey of OO in March 1959, conducted as part of a broader DCI survey "Program for Greater Efficiency in CIA," cited the improved working relationship between the two divisions and recommended closer physical proximity of the two components. "While there are various arguments against

organic combination of these large Divisions," the report declared," a closer consolidation would aid considerably in delineating the gray area between the two operations." This recommendation was, of course, fulfilled with FDD's move to the Matomic Building the following year. The move also resulted in a more formal and determined approach to the resolution of mutual problems. Even before the OO survey, the two divisions had conducted a study on the integration of their activities, based on a Bagnall proposal in December 1958, 770/ and in October 1959 a meeting was held to coordinate FDD-FBID press scrutiny and to establish procedures to avoid overlap. 771/ The outcome was a closer and more effective liaison between FDD and FBID on the operating level. An example of this was a series of unclassified guidance letters instituted as a means of conveying FBID's selection requirements to FDD's JPRS. A material improvement in the usefulness of journal summaries to FBID/RPD analysts was the result. 772/

FDD-FBID cooperation and coordinated operations became particularly significant at the time of the Cyprus crisis in the spring of 1964. FBIS monitors of the Mediterranean Bureau had already been removed from the island and only a few key technicians remained. The possibility existed that

the facility might be overrun at any time. In this crisis
help was requested from FDD to supply coverage should the
bureau be shut down. This the division agreed to do within
its capabilities of manpower and budget. 773/ It was, how-
ever, not put to the test. The crisis ended and the disrup-
tions created by it were handled by other bureaus of FBID.

Coordination and liaison extended also outside the IAC
(redesignated the United States Intelligence Board after
15 September 1958) to the non-intelligence community. These
activities, to cite only two, took the form of such projects
as the Public Law 480 translations and the assistance
rendered in the preparation of a *Monthly Index of Chinese
Accessions* (MICA). The first of these was based on a grant
of $1.2 million appropriated by Congress to the Office of
the President for the purchase -- among other things -- of
translations produced abroad from foreign S&T documents.
Administration of this foreign counterpart fund translation
effort was assigned to the NSF. In it handling of the pro-
ject the latter requested FDD assistance in preventing
duplication of work accomplished by other sources, and
during FY-1960 alone the processing of the material through
CTS resulted in the prevention of duplication of about 800
pages. 774/

The MICA project, initiated by the Library of Congress in late 1958, was to be carried out at an estimated total cost of $460,000. John Bagnall countered with an offer to prepare the index at one-fourth this cost, 775/ an estimate subsequently scaled upwards to one-half the Library of Congress figure. 776/ Through OCR coordination, an agreement was reached providing for FDD-Library of Congress collaboration of the project; the former, through JPRS, was to do the indexing and the latter, the editing and publication. In the course of the discussion, the reason for the higher Library of Congress estimate was disclosed — namely, the higher salary, editorial, and production standards required of the Library of Congress as compared with those of JPRS. 777/ The project was launched in May 1959.

F. Special Functions

The normal activity of an average FDD intelligence officer consisted of the routine exploitation of an assortment of foreign-language publications in the division. This work was periodically interspersed with the receipt and processing of classified translations which could not be sent out for contractual translation and therefore had to be done internally. This pattern, however, did not represent the

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total contribution of the division to the intelligence community, and this history would be incomplete if it did not make at least brief mention of two other forms of FDD activity, the ancillary functions and the special projects. These divergences from the normal FDD routine often played a significant role in the division's support functions.

1. Ancillary Activities

Instances of this type of FDD support are too numerous to mention individually, and representative examples must therefore suffice. The bulk of this activity took the form of translation interpretation service, which included direct interpreter/escort work, the transcription of sound tapes or recordings, and the interpretation of foreign newsreels, for OCR's Graphics Register.

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2. <u>Special Projects</u>

Another form of intelligence participation by FDD, but

one generally closely related to its exploitation/translation

function, was its conduct of or participation in special

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projects, in every case at the request of consumers requiring

special linguistic support. The effect of this activity on

the division was usually to increase its workload, often

tying up much-needed linguistic talent for the exclusive

use of a single undertaking. Since, however, the organization

was a common-concern service and oftentimes the only source

of specialized personnel, it adjusted its program to accom-

modate the new requirement. Sometimes a project involved

only a few linguists and its impact on division operations

was minimal and temporary; other times many more were involved

and the effect was much more severe. The projects varied

considerably in content and purpose. A few of the major ones

will be briefly treated here.

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G. Reorganization of the Reporting Program

In light of the growing demands for more service, the gradual erosion of the division's T/O, and increased emphasis on selected target areas, the scheduled reporting system which had served FDD and its consumers well in the six years and more following the adoption of NSCID 16 in 1953 reached a point in 1960 where a reexamination of its production and reporting methodology once again became a matter of concern to the division and to USIB. As described earlier in this chapter, the outcome of this reappraisal led, first of all, to an administrative reorganization of FDD from five to three area branches and to changes in the Support Branch. Coincidental with this reorganization, the division also revamped its operations so as to concentrate its exploitation efforts more exclusively on the activities of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, internally and internationally, and at the same time to make the most expeditious use of its linguisitic, supervisory, and support personnel.

The new approach involved a change of emphasis in the internal FDD reporting method. In place of across-the-board periodic reporting in broad fields of information in answer to blanket program requirements, the division now issued collated reports in depth from information collected over a given period on specific subjects. The latter serviced programmed or ad hoc priority requirements of the community. With top priority assigned to Bloc area subjects, the division also sought to experiment with ways of giving at least partial coverage in second and third priority areas despite shortages of funds and personnel.

The preparation of collated reporting in depth — or documentary research — was in fact not a new phenomenon; despite some opposition from various sectors in the intelligence community it had been employed to a limited extent in late 1950s, and a number of documentary studies prepared by the division then had proved the plan to be feasible. A decision was therefore made to employ this type of reporting as the exclusive method of FDD operation.

During May 1960, FDD began phasing out its scheduled reporting program and moving into documentary research on the Bloc. Several of the non-Bloc serial reports were discontinued, with the required coverage of these areas

henceforth to be provided by specific FDD studies or by
selected JPRS translations. At the same time, plans were
initiated for a foreign press bulletin to present on a daily
basis significant news on the Orbit not otherwise reported.
The new daily, originally called *Foreign Press Highlights*
but later retitled *Foreign Press Bulletin* (FPB), was to be
four to eight pages in length and was designed to get signif-
icant press items to consumers on a current basis. The new
report was issued for the first time on 9 June 1960. 794/

Informal discussion of the proposed FDD program early
in June 1960 evoked some doubts as to the wisdom of the change,
particularly on the part of the ORR division chiefs, who were
concerned about the matter of the timeliness of FDD reports
and expressed fear that the packaged reports could not keep
pace with the constantly changing ORR requirements. George
Carey assured the AD/RR that no change in the program was con-
templated pending exhaustive discussion on the matter with the
consumer Offices. 795/

In a 20 June memorandum Carey formally broached the
new plan to the CIA Office chiefs. He characterized it as
less demanding on FDD manpower and funds and stressed its
emphasis on supplying the consumers with more current report-
ing through the medium of the FPB. He also pointed out the

greater ease with which, in contrast with the present system, the information in FDD collated reports could be indexed and retrieved for later use. In attachments to this memorandum on the proposed plan, Carey listed reports to be phased out, transferred to JPRS, and retained by FDD. 796/

A meeting on 15 July of Office chiefs chaired by the DD/I resulted in approval of the new reporting program and it was agreed to adopt it on a trial basis for six months and then reexamine it. The proposed FPB was also discussed and the general consensus on the publication's value was negative. 797/ Following several more months' trial and subsequent discussions, the report was eventually discontinued in October 1960. Thereafter the results of coverage of this nature appeared in individual information reports in the OO-W series.

The 15 July decision by the Office chiefs was a tentative victory for the revised reporting program, but objections by ORR and others continued. Finally, as the result of a meeting between John Bagnall and the acting AD/RR, Edward Allen, and his division chiefs, all major issues were apparently resolved so far as ORR was concerned. 798/ However, discussion and comment on the program continued, mainly due to the reluctance of some to give up the old system,

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which had worked well. Other factors also entered into this. OCI, for example, was opposed to the proposed transfer of some FDD reports to JPRS on grounds that the JPRS product was inferior to that of FDD. 799/

More serious opposition to FDD's proposed change was encountered from OCR. This took the form of a reply on 17 August by the AD/CR, Paul A. Borel, to Carey's 20 June memorandum on the subject. Borel's quarrel was with what he regarded as poor and unreliable FDD support for two of his components, the Biographic Register (BR) and the Industrial Register (IR). He contended that the old systematic exploitation program based on normal routine coverage had not worked well; moreover, he felt that FDD support of BR and IR would be even less effective as a consequence of the proposed program. 800/

To counter the OCR complaints, the DAD/O arranged to have Bagnall meet with the AD/CR and the Chiefs of IR and BR. The result was an amicable confrontation in the course of which explanations were made and differences resolved. 801/

With the agreement of the CIA Offices on the changeover now apparently achieved, Carey saw no further reason to hold up the six-month trial period suggested by the DD/I in July, and the new reporting program was therefore put in

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force, 802/ but its full implementation was delayed until FDD

had agreed to a series of modifications as a result of meet-

ings and memoranda between the division and ORR in August

and September in which the latter spelled out its needs for

FDD service. 803/ The members of the CEFLP concurred with

the program on 9 September 1960. 804/

Although some Agency components, ORR for example, were

at best apathetic about the collated reporting of FDD, other

consumers were enthusiastic about its possibilities. Units

oriented toward political and sociological research and

clandestine components dealing in black propaganda made con-

siderable use of the new reporting. The

and the DD/I's Special Research

Staff were typical consumers. Outside CIA, the State

Department was another. Still another was the Arms Control

and Disarmament Agency.

Despite the apparent success of the ad hoc collated

reports, the program was relatively short-lived, lasting

approximately two years from 1960 to 1962. During FY-1961

the division issued 107 ad hoc reports, augmented by the

production of 70 serial-type reports issued on a continuing

basis. Of the latter, FDD prepared 28 and its JPRS field

offices produced 42. 805/ By the end of FY-1962 the

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research-type reporting in depth, accented the previous year,
had been virtually abandoned in favor of increased serialized
current reporting on sensitive areas.   Indicative of the new
trend was the decline in the number of special reports to 70
for the year, the monthly high point being January 1962 when
14 were issued.   Meanwhile, the number of serialized reports
increased to 77, 42 by FDD and 35 by JPRS. 806/ By the
following year FDD had gone full cycle and reverted to serial-
ized scheduled reporting.

One reason for the demise of FDD press research was the
increasingly greater community emphasis in 1961 and 1962 on
current reporting.   To meet the demand for timeliness, FDD
adopted new procedures for acquisition of needed publications,
exploitation of these sources, and dissemination of the
resultant reports.   Speed was also emphasized in its class-
ified translation service and the division aimed, with mixed
success, for 24-hour service on relatively short projects in
most languages and comparable speed for longer translations.

Because currency of information had become a paramount
requirement of USIB requesters, reduction in the time-lapse
between publication and receipt of sources was a necessity.
Some sources were received expeditiously through the cooper-
ation of various USIB agencies.   However, the most notable

speed-ups in acquisition of sources were made through the assistance of FBIS field facilities and by direct subscription through JPRS. Through these means some titles, formerly showing a time lapse of two to three weeks from date of publication, were now received within a week.

At about this time increased interest and emphasis in the intelligence community on Communist and insurgent developments in Cuba and Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Africa resulted in increased attention by the division to these world areas and current reporting on them was initiated in FY-1962. The first to appear was a weekly report on Communist Asia published in FDD and later a weekly report on Cuba was introduced. Translations on international Communism were processed on a priority basis by JPRS in lieu of the former monthly reports published by FDD.

FDD reporting on international Communism had been a long-standing requirement and the subject was one of several categories reported on a division-wide basis. Reporting this information initially in its *World Press Briefs on International Communism*, the division had, at Requirements Staff/ OIS request, initiated a new weekly report in mid-1956 entitled *World Press Summary on International Communist Developments* following release of the secret speech of Nikita Khrushchev.

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By 1959 this report had attained a distribution of well over 300 copies per issue. In 1960, with the increasing community interest in revisionism and dissidence in the World Communist movement, FDD was requested by the Clandestine Services (CS) to expand its coverage on the subject. The result was the issuance in the spring of 1960 of the FDD serial reports *Review of Communist Theoretical Journals* and *Communist Revisionism and Dissidence*, both of which were well received by the intelligence community and outside it. The CS requirement was unique to FDD experience in that it specifically invited comment and background by FDD analysts.

Developments in this field continued. A general meeting was held on 16 January 1962 attended by representatives of the three FDD substantive branches, CA/PROP, and RPB/FBID to arrange for comprehensive coverage of developments in international Communism and to discuss methods of expediting the processing and distribution of this material. It was decided to use FDD's *Translations on International Communist Developments* (TICD) as the vehicle for this purpose and to discontinue the bi-monthly *Review of Communist Theroretical Journals* and ad hoc publications bearing on the subject. Material was to be processed within two weeks of receipt. 807/ A meeting held 8 February 1962 by FDD and RPB personnel with

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representatives of the State Department's Bureau of

Intelligence and Research (INR) also considered coverage of

this subject and reviewed current FDD treatment of the Free

World press on international Communism. The meeting resulted

in the introduction of refinements in FDD reporting and

proposals for further expansion of the program. 808/

Early in 1963 reporting on international Communism was

carried one step further. On the basis of a 21 January con-

ference attended by State, USIA, and CIA representatives,

Special Assistant to the Chief, CA/PROP,   25X1

brought to FDD specific recommendations for consolidating

certain FDD and JPRS reports into one serial report contain-

ing all translations relating to world Communist dissension

from all documents sources, regardless of origin. Following

consultation with FBID concerning adaptation for reprint of

items of press origin on international Communism appearing in

the FBIS *Daily Report*, FDD on 1 February 1963 began incorpora-

ting in the TICD, now published and issued by JPRS, all

translations from foreign-langauge sources, Bloc as well as

non-Bloc, pertaining to the subject. On   recommen-   25X1

dation the TICD was made widely available to researchers

outside the government. 809/ Indicative of the quality of

the publication was the very favorable response received from

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the academic community. By general consensus it was highly
regarded. 810/

Related to FDD's coverage on international Communism
was its reporting on Third World areas, particularly on
insurgency and counter-insurgency. The division workload
increased in 1962 over 1961, due in large part to new prior-
ity requirements for coverage of Africa, Latin America, and
Southeast Asia. This shift in emphasis necessitated the
diversion of 12 professionals from assignments on the Sino-
Soviet Bloc to the newly critical areas. 811/

Beginning with a weekly *Press Information Report on
Cuba*, FDD began reporting insurgency and counter-insurgency
potentials in sensitive areas on 25 August 1961. When greater
stress was placed on the subject in 1962, the division added
a report entitled *Press Information Relating to Insurgency and
Counter-insurgency: Africa* on a twice-weekly schedule begin-
ning 23 August 1962 and followed this with similar reporting
on Latin America, the Near East, and South and East Asia. By
late September 1963, after the Cuba report was merged with
that on Latin America, FDD was publishing five twice-weekly

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insurgency and counter-insurgency reports.* 812/

In line with the stress on currency in the mid-1960s, brief mention should be made concerning the division's new World Press Reaction series. Devised as a method of testing in an expeditious manner, world attitudes toward a variety of significant global events, these division-wide reports comprised a collection of rapidly translated, assembled, and disseminated comment from the world press. The range of subject matter was broad and in 1964 included comment on topics as diverse as the Warren Report, the change in Soviet leadership, and Communist China's explosion of a nuclear device. The responsible officer for this project was

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Among changes included in the growth of the division's operations was the establishment of a number of staffs which were set up to perform certain specialized functions associated with its regular operations. In the 1950s and 1960s

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* One indication of the timeliness of FDD's Latin American coverage was the fact that, as a result of indications of increasing opposition to the Cabral regime in the Dominican Republic, monitoring of the Dominican press was initiated on 22 March 1965. 813/ In light of events in that country during the following month, this move was indeed well-timed.

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they made a unique contribution by going beyond the normal

work of the organization and providing, each in its own way,

assistance to consumers supplementary to routine services.

They will be treated in the next chapter.

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